In the preface to the 3rd edition of his book The Arab Cold War Malcolm Kerr explicitly argued against the idea that Arab politics from 1958-1970 were simply a projection of decisions made in foreign capitals such as Washington, London, Moscow and Jerusalem, emphasizing instead the strong roles of political ambition, tactical convenience and realism among Arab statesmen. I would argue that, in the particular case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kerr was right about importance of ambition, convenience and realism in Arab politics, but wrong when he argued that regional dynamics were more important than foreign influence. Rather, smaller Arab nations needed to position themselves between Cold Wars. In the case of Jordan, its relatively weak position in the Arab world (particularly its lack of financial independence) resulted in a necessary attention to what happened in foreign capitals. Dependent on foreign aid for its very existence, Jordan walked a tightrope between Western patrons and Arab peers. This study focuses specifically on the period of the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963). During this period the Hashemite Kingdom struggled to maintain internal cohesion while caught in the crosshairs of royalist-revolutionary tensions in the region. Compounding this already tenuous situation, Jordan found itself dependent on foreign aid from Western governments increasingly interested in distancing themselves from royalists in order to court Nasser. These various tensions came together around the Yemeni Coup of 1962, when US recognition of the revolutionary regime in Sanaa, prompted the Hashemite Kingdom to transition from a government dependent on a "special relationship" with a Western power, to a more diverse player in both the Arab and global Cold Wars. This case study uses a blend of declassified US and British documents and secondary monographs to explore Jordanian responses to the changing currents of international relations, and the effects that these had on both Jordan's foreign and domestic politics, with special attention to the focus of King Hussein on maintaining the preeminence of the Hashemite family in Jordan. It will argue that Hussein and his government exhibited exactly the ambition and realism for which Kerr argued, but did so on a global scale, taking advantage of Cold War politics and regional rivalries to redefine Jordan's political opportunities and international role.