This paper analyzes the relationship between the Qajar and Ottoman empires and contextualizes it in the emerging sectarian power struggle during the late nineteenth century. The unprecedented growth of Shi’ism in Iraq during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alarmed the Ottoman state, which justified and derived its power from the Sunni caliphate. To mediate this, the Ottomans implemented various laws and policies to decrease the Shi’i presence in Iraq, including the promoting “Sunni” education, sending Sunni ulama to live amongst the Iraqis, and even offering funding to the Shi’i communities to establish rapport. These policies were also intended to diminish Qajar influence in the region, the primary force supporting the religious minority’s growth. The examination of Qajar primary documents during Mozafareddin Shah’s reign from 1896-1906, however, reveals that the implementation of Ottoman policies had little effect on Qajar officials and the Shi’i populace. Qajar officials continued to support Shi’i ulama, the upkeep of Shi’i mosques, and the hosting of Shi’i commemorations in Iraqi cities. Despite Ottoman intentions, the Treaty of Erzurum in 1828 prevented Ottomans from enacting more effective reforms in addressing Qajar involvement, ultimately allowing the Persians to continue their ties with the local Shi’is of Iraq. This treaty gave Persian officials foreign status in the Empire, thus guaranteeing state protection. This special legal status gave Persian officials more room to maneuver than the Ottomans had intended. By the late nineteenth century, Shi’ism was so strongly entrenched amongst the Iraqis that the Ottoman efforts failed to have much impact. Regardless of the actions taken by the Ottoman government, Persian influence in Iraq remained pervasive, an ongoing trend that still thrives on international and regional politics.