Since the awarding of the 2022 World Cup to the state of Qatar in 2010, the highly restrictive and oft-exploitative laws that govern temporary labor in the Arab Gulf monarchies have come under mounting scrutiny from international rights NGOs and Western media outlets alike. While much anthropological and sociological work has been devoted to understanding how these kefala (sponsorship) regimes operate in practice, much less attention had been given to the political and economic interests that underpin migrant labor policies. While some works have noted the business community’s interest in importing low-cost labor and national populations’ effective acquiescence, existing models do not fully account for policy change. Yet change has occurred all the same, with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all adopting new sponsorship laws over the past decade. In seeking to provide a more nuanced explanation of existing variations in the Gulf’s sponsorship laws, I examine available data regarding the size and composition of migrant workforces as well as the legal texts that govern these labor regimes. Ultimately, variation in legal regimes can be largely explained in terms of Gulf states’ efforts to attract and retain skilled workers as well as the degree to which migration policymaking is isolated from the influence of domestic pressure groups. This suggests that, rather than converging a “reformed” labor system in the Gulf, sponsorship system are instead evolving along different pathways dictated far more by domestic institutions than international pressure. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of these findings for future political advocacy efforts with respect to migrant workers’ rights in the Gulf.