For decades, historians explained the Western intervention in Iran of 1953 as in terms of anticipating an impending communist takeover, a claim often asserted at the time by the politicians in Great Britain and the United States. In 2001, Ervand Abrahamian put the accuracy of this explanation in the unfolding events in Iran between 1951 and 1953 into question. His questioning resulted in a reorientation of the discussion of the 1950s in Iran. In my presentation I would like to place the events of 1951-53 in Iran into the wider context of Western policies toward oil producing countries since the mid-interwar years. For instance, is there a relationship between the Mexican nationalization of oil in 1938 and the Iranian one in 1951? What are the important discursive elements on ‘oil nationalization’ and the ‘Mexican example’ in the early 1950s? Could Iran have succeeded in extracting, producing, and selling its oil? In this regard, was Mexico successful? How should one interpret the anti-nationalization discourse rampant in the oil industry in the post-war era? Moreover, were the American and British positions on the Iranian crisis monolithic? How relevant is the European post-WWII recovery to the oil crisis in Iran? Did the ‘communist danger’ seem more of a reality in Europe than in Iran? What did ‘partial nationalization’ mean? In seeking answers to such questions, this analysis will make use of an archival collection, available at the University of Wyoming, of an oil expert, Walter J. Levy, who served in a number of government positions as an oil advisor. This collection, so far untapped by historians, is relevant not only because of its richness in providing a regional and global perspective on the dynamics of the oil industry but also important since it gives voice to the Iranians, the representatives of the oil industry, and the policy-makers in DC. While the existing secondary literature, memoirs, and other unclassified sources will serve to complement what might be ‘edited off’ in the Levy collection, the shifting dynamics of the Western political economy of oil will enhance our understanding of the 1950s in Iran, Europe, and the US alike.