This paper explores the manifestations of sectarian and national identity in Lebanon through an analysis of the results of an independent and experimental public opinion survey conducted in 2024. Lebanon has preserved sectarian and religious-based identities through the confessional political system since its independence. While Lebanese national unity has been promoted, Lebanese citizens are institutionally expected to identify with their own sects, and this has sometimes fostered political conflicts and violent civil wars. However, the manifestation of sectarian identity has not always been constant throughout time. For example, political elites such as party leaders tend to refrain from sectarian attitudes and to provoke nationalistic narratives in the run-up to elections when the electoral system makes cooperation with other sects crucial for victory. Previous studies have pointed to such institutional factors as one of the determinants of Lebanese political orientation toward sectarianism or nationalism. Based on this, this study seeks to fill two research gaps: first, the impact of non-institutional factors, especially changes in the macro-political environment, on Lebanese sectarian and national identity, and second, not only the impact of elite discourse (e.g. mobilization strategies), but also non-elite perceptions of sectarianism and nationalism. Bridging these gaps will provide new insights into previous studies that have tended to discuss the reality of sectarianism in Lebanon from the perspective of elite-driven political dynamism, while at the same time contributing to a deeper understanding of the reality of Lebanon’s confessionalism. By analyzing the results of a survey experiment using two scenarios, one of growing domestic political instability and the other of increasing foreign military threats, this paper analyzes trends and patterns in the changing attitudes of non-elite Lebanese (citizens) toward sectarianism and nationalism. The question is: under what attributes and under what conditions do citizens tend to gravitate toward sectarianism and/or nationalism? Previous studies on Lebanon’s sectarian politics have been enriched with mainly qualitative methods such as discourse analysis. However, or because of it, few have sufficiently dealt with the perceptions of non-elite citizens. This is likely due to the limitations of reliable data collections. In contrast, this paper conducts its own independent public opinion survey and also uses experimental methods to obtain answers to sensitive questions on sectarian and national identity.