In this paper, I argue that the juxtaposition of sectarianism with nationalism gives an incomplete picture of the Lebanese situation, especially at the popular level. Many scholars believe that the creation and buttressing of a Lebanese national identity would unite people and lead them away from sectarian divisions but I argue against a standard view that understands Lebanon’s past, present, and future through a sectarian/national and sectarian/secular binaries. I propose an alternative theory, what I call sectarian habitus. Drawing from Bourdieu’s (1980) conceptualization of habitus, I use the term sectarian habitus—the set of sectarian dispositions that people experience through daily social relations that structure both the conscious and non-conscious behavior of different sectarian groups in Lebanon—to illuminate the likely failure of a national Lebanese identity and the enduring power of Lebanese sectarianism but also the possibility of a non-divisive and non-conflictual popular sectarianism that might allow for a different Lebanese future. This formulation of habitus allows for the consideration of popular practices in reproducing sectarian structures in times of war, peace and coexistence. I analyze Lebanese sectarianism by focusing on its conscious, non-conscious, and imaginary attributes that account for the social reproduction of the sectarian social structures and sectarianism’s resiliency. I look at the importance of the popular level, day-to-day life practices and the sectarian imaginations of Lebanese citizens in shaping and reproducing these structures while also thinking about the role of the political/sectarian leadership and the sectarian structures of government institutions. I closely examine the events that followed PM Hariri’s assassination, mainly the four weeks in February and March 2005, preceding the so-called “Cedar Revolution.” I show that the period leading to the Cedar revolution on March 14th was as important as that day, if not more, in contrast to most analyses of the period which just regard it as a build-up to March 14th. The four weeks prior exhibited intense changes in the sectarian habitus at the popular level. This theory – sectarian habitus – gives people’s actions throughout the four-week period importance and understands them in the context of larger structures at play. This four-week period, however short it was, needs to be reconsidered as one of the most important periods in Lebanese sectarian history because it showed a glimpse of different sectarian imaginations.