This paper explores the ways in which the ayatollahs of Iraq entered the political scene in 2003, after decades of silence under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Through analysis of their writings, fatwas, decrees, bayenat and speeches, from 2003 to 2015, at a time when they became politically active, I catalogue their interaction with the state on important issues such as the role of competing social groups, the quietism vs. activism debate within Shiism, discourses on democracy and the sectarian conflict. My analysis demonstrates that rather than adhering to their religious duties, as they had practiced for decades prior to 2003, they have come to the forefront as rational political actors. Rather than beginning with their religious principles and applying them to the political context, they are keenly aware of the political milieu, shaped by it and are putting forth fatwas and recommendations based on the realities of Iraq. As such, they allow for politics to shape and mold their religious edicts and beliefs, not vice versa. The ayatollahs became the most important social actors in the new public sphere—they offered a collective and sustained voice for democracy, accountability and unity in Iraq. Going against conventional wisdom, the clerical class has been at for forefront of social change, debunking the myth of sectarian fighting and revealing their prominence as important public intellectuals. This study is important for a number of reasons. First, it brings to light religious voices other than that of Ayatollah Sistani, who receives the most attention because he followed by more than half of the world’s Shiites. I show the diversity of opinions within the hawza among ayatollahs Najafi, Fayyad, Hakim and Sistani. on important political matters among. These other voices are understudied. Second, this study helps us to understand the power of informal politics and how social groups gain leverage by operating alongside, rather than within the political system. The ayatollahs, choosing a brand of activism that differed from Khomeinism, allowed them to maintain their legitimacy and power in meaningful ways. Last, the narratives of the ayatollahs, even in moments when their fatwas were not effective, served an important function. They were quasi-public intellectuals. They worked to correct some of the dominant myths that served to increase violence and fractionalization in society. Their narratives offered correctives on the artificiality of Iraq, its ostensible entrenched sectarianism and its incompatibility to democracy.