Recent interventions in the scholarship on the Great Revolt in Palestine (1936-39) have focused in great detail on the extensive repression meted out to Palestinian communities by British forces, sometimes arguing that this, rather than alleged defects or tribalism of the revolt’s leadership, was the cause of the rebellion’s downfall. Regardless of its merits or shortcomings, this literature has done much to illuminate and interrogate the colonial state. By contrast, comparatively little new research has been done into the political organization and social mobilization that undergirded the uprising. This paper argues that the organization of the rebellion was central to its effectiveness and remarkable endurance against considerable odds. Although for good reason the Great Revolt is seen as an armed campaign, it was far more than this. Looking primarily at the second phase of the revolt (1937-39) and based mostly in published Arabic memoirs and captured rebel documents contained in the Central Zionist Archive, this research highlights popular, largely non-violent participation in the revolt. Specifically, it examines the use of strikes in urban centers and the formation of village committees in rural areas, neither of which has garnered much prior attention. Both practices embodied broad rebel aims: disaffiliating from the colonial regime, promoting indigenous self-governance, and aiding the rebellion. Urban strikes were launched to protest military outrages, the tactics of the counterinsurgency, and colonial political initiatives, and resulted in a contest of wills to control cities, towns, and their populations, with the government often fighting back with curfews and other punishments. Strikes, which recalled the unprecedented general strike of 1936, were smaller afterwards but clearly recognizable as a form of civil disobedience and rebel solidarity. In the countryside, where the government acknowledged that it had lost “contact” with most of the country’s Arab population, rebels established village committees to manage and coordinate local affairs. As such they mobilized men and materiel while keeping tabs on informants, but they also served local interests like the preservation of order, in which capacity they could make demands on insurgent fighters. Two preliminary conclusions that this research raises are that non-violent forms of participation in the revolt were widespread and have been overlooked in its second phase and that the rebels succeeded where the state failed at developing ground-level capacities that could reach into and mobilize communities. The paper explores these practices.