Narratives of political persecution propel the careers of presidents, prime ministers, and prominent activists. Yet despite their seeming importance for gaining and wielding national power, the political psychology of victimhood rarely extends beyond anecdote. Under what conditions do leaders deploy such narratives? When does highlighting one's own political persecution “work” as a strategy of political mobilization?  And how are these narratives perceived and acted upon by ordinary citizens?  A theory linking political sacrifice to an electoral advantage is supported with evidence from Turkey and Tunisia—two countries where Islamist politicians experienced long-standing political repression. I posit that narratives of political persecution can be effectively deployed by both incumbent and opposition politicians to gain support. The nature of victimhood – whether it is experienced by a targeted group, or is more widespread – conditions when highlighting one’s political persecution mobilizes voters to action. In a first step, I test the proposed link between political sacrifice and an electoral advantage though two survey experiments in Turkey. Results of the first experiment, conducted with 650 adult Turkish citizens between April and June 2015, reveal that exposure to information about an Islamist candidate's political imprisonment significantly improves respondents' levels of trust, closeness, and likelihood to vote for the candidate. Results of a second survey experiment, conducted with 430 adult Turkish citizens immediately following the July 2016 Turkish coup attempt, provide evidence that narratives of victimhood can also benefit incumbents when the nation feels threatened. Exposure to information that President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an was the victim of an assassination attempt during the failed coup increases trust in President Erdo?an. Interview and survey data from Tunisia provide strong evidence for the theory’s generalizability, but also furnish its scope conditions. Fifty in-depth interviews with politicians from Tunisia’s nine largest political parties conducted in 2016 strongly suggest that politicians who were persecuted under the Tunisian dictatorship received an electoral advantage during the country’s first post-autocratic elections. Scope conditions are established, however, with null findings from a survey experiment conducted in February 2016, following a period of backlash against the Islamist Al-Nahda and the subsequent rise of an autocratic successor party Nidaa Tounes to power. Whereas narratives of persecution mobilize mainstream voters when repression is generalized, these narratives fall flat when repression is targeted or the actor is not or is no longer a credible victim.