When it comes to transnational ideologies in the Arab world, few are as powerful as that of the Muslim Brotherhood, the region's oldest and most organised Islamist group. Following the uprisings of the Arab Spring that resulted in Muslim Brotherhood-led governments in Egypt and Tunisia, rulers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, though not traditionally sites of Islamist complaint, came to focus on the potential political influence of Muslim Brotherhood organisations at home. This paper will trace the ways in which transnational migration patterns initially provided space for ideological influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf, as well as how such migratory flows altered individual government policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood, with particular emphasis on the cases of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In so doing, we will also examine ways in which the relative strength of the rival transnational ideology of Arab nationalism affected the flow of Islamist migrants into the Gulf in addition to government views of these new residents. Though the experiences of the GCC states with the Muslim Brotherhood were initially quite similar, with all governments welcoming Brotherhood implants to staff their nascent education and judicial systems at a time of heightened Arab nationalist complaint, they later changed course, as illustrated by the current and 2014 Gulf crisis. This paper will take into account how and why states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE that are otherwise quite similar developed strikingly different policies, both in terms of regulating migration and monitoring the local population, when it comes to the transnational ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. It will also assess the extent to which such states have aimed either to aid or to cripple the Brotherhood movement across borders through major foreign policy decisions, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.