Diversionary war theory maintains that state incumbents go to war to keep their officers busy fighting an external enemy rather than plotting for a domestic power grab. Yet, war is not an option for states with small armies facing powerful neighbors. This paper argues that an army’s deployment in foreign peacekeeping missions has positive effects for coup-proofing similar to those assumed in the diversionary war theory. I introduce the theory of diversionary peace and explore Tunisia’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions as an empirical plausibility probe. In authoritarian regimes, such as Ben Ali’s Tunisia, foreign peacekeeping reduces the risk of military coups and therefore helps leaders stay in power. I discuss four mechanisms that link foreign peacekeeping to coup-proofing at home: peacekeeping participation establishes feasibility obstacles for coup coordination, the allocation of economic resources to officers, the institutionalization of the military apparatus, and a professionalized ethos in the officer corps. Drawing on Tunisia as a single case study, the paper’s empirical findings come from interviews with retired military officers in Tunisia as well as original data from a nationally representative survey on popular perceptions of the military conducted in August 2017. Data on Tunisia’s peacekeeping missions come from the United Nations and the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense.