A recent trend among moderate Islamist movements is to go transnational, open branches worldwide, and internationalize their disputes. This is a puzzling development because the targets and aims of these movements are not transnational but domestic. Radical Islamist groups, such as the Al Qaeda, go transnational because they aim at and target the “global” hegemonic order. However, many moderate Islamist movements that wish to Islamize their own “domestic” constituencies are also choosing to go transnational, even though their “local” aims and targets remain unchanged. Hence, this paper asks: “Why are moderate Islamist movement going transnational when they aim for domestic change?” This is an important question to ask because it takes questions of Muslim democracy and Islam-West relations heads-on. Popular belief holds that Islamist movements by definition are anti-West, anti-democratic, and anti-liberal. However, transnational Islamist movements under consideration here have Western allies, speak of liberal democracy and human rights, and endorse interfaith dialogue. Therefore, it is crucial to understand this widespread yet unexplored trend taking place in the Muslim World today. To start answering this question, I look at the transnationalization of two moderate Islamist movements in comparative perspective: the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement and the Turkish Gulen Movement. Both movements are domestic movements that have gone transnational, are non-violent and avoid anti-West rhetoric. One important difference, however, is that the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality Movement has been harshly repressed for decades by the Moroccan regime, while the Turkish Gulen Movement has generally enjoyed good relations with the Turkish regime. To unveil the motivations behind the transnationalization of these two movements, I have conducted in-depth fieldwork interviewing leaders and members of both movements in Morocco and Turkey and explored archival materials from the countries’ main Islamist and secular political magazines. My findings, in line with Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang model, show that these moderate Islamist movements in the absence of domestic political channels to express their demands and grievances at the domestic level are turning to transnational mobilization. In doing this, they aim to pressure closed domestic regimes by making appeals to international institutions and transnational allies. Furthermore, they aim to strengthen their domestic stronghold by extending their influence beyond borders. This paper draws from theories and literatures on international norms and institutions, comparative social movements, and democratization.