What have been the programmatic contents of party competition in postuprising Tunisia? Political scientists often assume a Left-Right cleavage—pitting the proponents of wealth protection against those of redistribution—to be a ubiquitous feature structuring political party systems. But this type of cleavage has been conspicuously understated or absent during recent party-system liberalization in some parts of the Arab world. With political party competition focusing primarily on questions of identity, Tunisian voters had trouble placing political parties according to their economic policies (Benstead, Lust, and Malouche 2012), Egyptian voters assumed Islamists to be more supportive of redistribution than Communists (Masoud 2014), and people throughout the region have shown little relationship between party choice and preferences for economic policy (Wegner and Cavatorta 2018). These areas of disconnect raise questions regarding the economic policy choices parties in the region present to voters. Have voters failed to understand the distinctions between parties or have parties failed to create distinctions that adhere to the expectations of researchers of comparative politics? To understand how parties have distinguished themselves from each other, especially on questions of economic policy, I use computer-assisted content analysis of the electoral platforms for 14 major political parties that competed in either Tunisia’s 2011 or 2014 elections, as well as interviews with some of their authors. Employing the WORDFISH method (Slapin and Proksch 2008), I present an ideological scaling of the documents as a whole, as well as the passages that focus on social and economic policy. I argue that in most areas of social and economic policy, major Tunisian parties have offered convergent policy platforms. Where they have differed most starkly in talking about economic issues is in their usage of technocratic or populist language. By examining the language Tunisian parties have used to distinguish themselves from each other, even as their policies converge, this paper aims to contribute to the ways in which party systems politicize economic issues in new democracies.