Since the resignation of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, there has been a virtual absence in press discussions of the “marriage crisis,” which dominated public discourses in the final years of his reign. The term was used to refer to the supposedly large number of middle-class men (and women) who were unable to afford the staggering costs of marriage due to the dire economic state of the nation, namely, rampant unemployment and rising inflation rates. The near absence of a “marriage crisis” since the inception of the 2011 Egyptian “revolution” as the economic situation worsened suggests that the crisis served as more of a discursive space to critique Mubarak’s neoliberal policies than a reflection of widespread bachelorhood. In addition, recent sociological research reveals that in spite of the harsh economic results of Mubarak’s neoliberal policies, the marriage rate of middle-class men has remained steady and even increased during the apex of the so-called ‘marriage crisis’ on the eve of Mubarak’s fall. This paper analyzes the discursive representations of the crisis, the reasons offered to explain it, why it caused such alarm, and what those apprehensions reveal about Mubarak’s regime and its middle-class subjects. In doing so it makes three interrelated arguments. First, it proposes that public discourses of “the private realm” should be studied from a class perspective. Second, it shows that discourses of the marriage crisis have emerged whenever Egypt has been on the verge of tumultuous transition over the past century. This historical continuity discloses much more about middle-class subjects’ sociopolitical and economic frustrations than it does over their marital prospects. Finally, it shows that the ways in which this particular discourse has been adopted and abandoned over time reveals the complexities of these subjects’ political voices and their ambiguous relationship with the nation’s neoliberal policies.