Averroism Revisited: Does Ibn Rushd's interpretation of the Qur'an provide the basis for a modernist rereading of Islamic law When looking to reinterpret the Qur'an, Ibn Rushd is frequently singled out by modernists as a model of "reason" and anti-literalism, or by postmodernists as an apologist for interpretive license. This essay investigates the claim that Ibn Rushd's manner of interpreting the Qur'an provides a basis for rereading revelation in order to bring Islamic law into line with "reason" and changed circumstances. To be sure, the Cordoban jurist's theory of interpretation in Fasl al-maqal emphasizes the importance of philosophical training for the analogical reading of problematic passages in revelation. At the same time, in the chapter on esoteric interpretation (al-ta'wil) in Kitab al-kashf 'an manahij al-'adilla, Ibn Rushd distinguishes between the kinds of people to whom differing levels of interpretation ought to be addressed, and expresses his(never fulfilled) wish to write a thorough commentary. However, absent such a commentary, neither of the works mentioned above offer a reliable indication in practice of how to derive law from the commands and prohibitions of sacred text, or even the best way to modify such law. Rather, for legal norms we must turn to Ibn Rushd's al-Daruri fi usul al-fiqh, the neglected epitome of Ghazali's Mustasfa, which helped to introduce Aristotelian logic into the methodology of Islamic law. Through a close reading of his citations from the Qur'an in al-Daruri, it is evident that Ibn Rushd was a firm believer in the careful use of analogy in interpretation. Indeed, this Maliki jurist's classic work on differences of legal opinion, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, essentially shows how to triangulate between the opinions of the madhahib, and is if anything the work of a gradualist, not a revolutionary. Contextual evidence and Ibn Rushd's own legal writings demonstrate his commitment to the Qur'an as a source of law, and to the indispensable role of the religious and intellectual sciences in creating jurists capable of justifiable interpretations of scripture. While his basic traditionalism in law should be stressed, this essay concludes by pointing out the complementary in Ibn Rushd's legal writings between philosophical ethics derived from Aristotle and legal norms derived from the Qur'an.