In the first part of my paper, I argue that Ibn Taymiyyah managed to develop an eccentric theory of language that is suitable for his version of nominalism. I start by sketching the main elements of what I call “the traditional theory of language”, basing my sketch on Qāḍī ʽAbd al-Ğabbār's treatment, and showing the problems that it creates for any nominalist. I show also how this theory achieved almost a consensus among Muslim philosophers and theologians. Then I discuss the main doctrine in Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory of language, as it appears in his criticism of the well-established veridicality-tropicality dichotomy. This doctrine revolves around Ibn Taymiyyah's assertion that there is no convention before use. While this theory of language suits Ibn Taymiyyah's nominalism, it creates, however, its own set of problems. After dealing with some of these, I discuss the major problem facing Ibn Taymiyyah's doctrine, namely the need for a new theory of reference. I show how Ibn Taymiyyah, by way of extending his doctrine, and by modifying the concept of "common scope", manages to develop a theory of reference that dispenses with the need for universals. In the second part of my paper, I deal with some of the theological implications of Ibn Taymiyyah's theory of language. I show here how Ibn Taymiyyah's theory stands as the cornerstone of his theological project. Regardless of his clear theological motivations, Ibn Taymiyyah meant for his theology to be the only valid corollary to his theory of language, rather than the other way around. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah falls short of that. To show that, I carefully go back to Ğurğānī's formulation of the dichotomy, rather than the one developed by Sakkākī and later commentators. While accepting the fact that Ğurğānī is an adherent to the traditional theory of language, I suggest that his formulation can be re-established within Ibn Taymiyyah's linguistic framework. This may pave the way for a different theology from the one adopted by Ibn Taymiyyah, while accepting his premises. This means that while Ibn Taymiyyah's theology requires accepting his theory of language, his theory of language can be the basis for different theologies. It means also that attacking Ibn Taymiyyah's theology does not involve necessarily stripping his theory of language from any merit of its own.