This paper examines the emergence of Sunni Muslim street mobilization in the wake of the February 14th 2011 Bahraini uprising. Drawing on social movement theory it argues that framing was pivotal in the mobilization. More specifically the paper analyses the framing processes of the Shura council members of Sahwat al-Fateh based on fieldwork conducted in Bahrain in the spring 2012. The Sunni-dominated counter-movements that emerged in reaction to the uprising did not only call for stronger government responses to the uprising and more efficient security measures, which had been the case in similar situations earlier, but also voiced political demands. Calling for political reform and an end to government corruption their message had similarities with the February 14th movement, though they also carried anti-opposition sentiments. This paper argues that the Sunni Muslims in their framing drew lines between themselves and the government, creating boundaries that shaped their political identity. Whilst the ethno-religious divide in Bahrain still separates the Sunni- and Shia- dominated movements and defines the idea of "the other" amongst great parts of the population, I find that there is a growing recognition that the interests of the Sunni government is not necessarily the same as the interests of the Sunni street. This creates a new political dynamic where the government is not necessarily able to rally and control Sunni Muslim political movements in the same way as they have previously. New youth movements emerging want to influence politics themselves and not just have their interests represented by the old political and religious authority figures. The demarcation lines in the Bahraini political landscape is changing and the members Sahwat al-Fates see themself as outsiders in Bahraini politics despite being Sunni Muslims. This can make regime survival increasingly difficult for the Bahraini government, which is used to creating support for the system by underlining cleavages along ethno-religious lines.