What is the effect of social cohesion on violent strategies? Previous literature has argued that a higher level of social cohesion predisposes groups to non-violent strategies, whereas a low level of social cohesion makes it difficult to maintain adherence to non-violence. This paper explores this debate by looking at the impact of social cohesion on preferences for violence versus non-violence in unstable institutional environments. In particular, I focus on the Palestinian territories, where the Palestinian Authority consistently struggles with maintaining legitimacy and coherence in an increasingly hostile international environment. The paper utilizes a survey experiment with a priming component, using a nationally representative sample from both the West Bank and Gaza. Preliminary results show that three variables increase the preference for violent strategies in comparison to nonviolent strategies: being present in Gaza, affiliation with a political party, and political grievance. Specifically, a sense that the government is unresponsive to the public increases the preference for violent strategies. On the other hand, the various measures of social cohesion are not statistically significant. This would imply that a preference for violent strategy is perhaps not determined by the level of social cohesion or an individual’s social embeddedness, as once presumed.