In the digital era, increasingly expanded security demands and practices have engendered new techno-biological control and surveillance techniques that track ordinary citizens' lives the world over. Turkey is one of the countries leading the pack by using multiple control methods to repress its citizens and intrude into people's lives' most intimate realms. To identify and characterize Turkey's new surveillance and security strategies and assess their impact on both society and the regime, I focus on an analysis of the history of those who have had their job appointment or promotion withdrawn due to the refusal of their security vetting and archival background following the 2016 coup attempt. Having failed their compulsory security check, these people call themselves and are known in current Turkish public discourse as 'security vetting victims' (güvenlik soruşturması mağdurları). Many have lost their jobs or had their job appointment or promotions withdrawn, been permanently blacklisted on the basis of the unsubstantiated accusation of being 'connected with terrorism' (terörle iltisaklı olanlar) and then branded as 'objectionable' (sakıncalı) and therefore suspect. I pose two main questions: how do the new control practices in Turkey differ from their older authoritarian police security forms and do new methods point to a categorically different control system? I argue that the thoroughgoing changes to Turkey's security strategies and the use of new technologies indicate not a mere intensification of the use of surveillance methods as forms of extra-legal punishment but rather the transformation of the governing techniques of securitization from that of state of emergency rule towards authoritarian biosecurity rule. Keywords Security vetting, archival background, authoritarianism, biopolitics, biosecurity state, Turkey, lateral surveillance