Climate change poses a challenge to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – because of their heavy dependance on fossil fuel production, specifically oil and gas, for a sizeable fraction of government revenue and economic activity. Given that oil and gas sector contribute between 20% and 50% of GDP and between 40% and 90% of total government revenues, GCC economies tend to be highly vulnerable to external shocks affecting oil prices, including any major decline that would result if stringent climate mitigation measures were implemented overseas. At the same time, GCC’s non-oil economic sectors – such as agriculture, food security, water, fisheries, tourism, and infrastructure – are also affected by the adverse physical impacts of climate change and could suffer from large gross domestic product (GDP) losses of 0.2 to 0.5% annually after 2027, and 1.5 to 3% annually by 2067. Such GDP losses could stem from rising temperatures, falling annual rainfall, sea level rise, increased exposure to extreme events like intense rainfall, decrease in work productivity due to heat/humidity exposure, and proliferation of infectious diseases. This paper argues that addressing the impacts of climate change in both oil and non-oil sectors is essential in order to ensure the long-term resilience and sustainability of the GCC economies. Using Saudi Arabia as a case study, this paper assesses the challenges and opportunities for aligning climate policies with the kingdom’s economic diversification strategies. It, furthermore, examines the role of Saudi Arabia’s political economic structures – featured by deriving a substantial part of revenues from oil exports – to influencing the country’s domestic climate policy and governance. Drawing from secondary literature and interviews with Saudi climate change and energy experts, the paper reveals that effective governance of climate change in Saudi Arabia still faces fundamental challenges such as low data and information profile; absence of a climate action plan; heavy involvement of the Ministry of Energy in addressing climate-related matters; and fragmented climate-related policies and efforts. Furthermore, the paper reveals that tangible action on climate change has been delayed due to three political economic strategies: defensive strategies (by expanding public sector dominance of climate action and strategic isolation of other climate change interest groups), material strategies (i.e. using of large-scale low-carbon technologies to protect interests in hydrocarbons), and discursive strategies (i.e. influencing public debate through media framing).