Unfree and unfair elections in nondemocratic states are designed to guarantee victory for the leader’s coalition, but since these types of elections are held repeatedly, in some cases they pave the way for the convergence of polarized opposition groups. The frequency of nondemocratic elections provides a landscape for divided opposition groups to realize that to affect the outcomes of these elections, they must coordinate to some degree. However, this does not mean that the nondemocratic leader will stop engaging in electoral malpractice in the next election. Instead, coordination among opposition groups forces the nondemocratic leader to close loopholes and to change electoral rules and procedures. In this study, I investigate Iranian legislative elections between 1996 and 2016 and scrutinize the ability of both the leader’s coalition and the opposition coalition to mobilize the masses in large and small cities. Iranian electoral politics illustrates that there have been elections where the opposition camp has neutralized electoral malpractice and has outperformed it. It has happened when against all the efforts of the leader’s coalition (i.e., the establishment), the opponents of the status quo (i.e., the nonestablishment) have been able to solve problems of coordination among themselves in legislative elections.