In 2019, Algeria witnessed for one year one of the most promising moments in its post-independence history. Millions of Algerians from all walks had taken up to the streets to demand that the ailing president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ran the country under a sultanistic regime for two decades, to retire. They also demanded that all incumbent rulers leave, and that the political system erected after independence be replaced by democracy and good governance. The movement forced the military, the backbone of the regime, to remove Bouteflika from office. Regardless, the movement continued and was only stopped because of the pandemic. Though they had depicted the hirak as a blessed movement that saved Algeria from catastrophe, the new rulers decided to end it. Like its predecessor, the regime addressed a handful grievances and established its own roadmap for an alleged transition to a “New Algeria,” By the third anniversary of the hirak, it was obvious that the regime has no intention of changing the reviled political system or to initiate genuine political and economic reforms. Algeria, a rentier state, has always relied on high hydrocarbon prices to coopt citizens. Whenever prices dwindle, the regime promises to introduce reforms and when they increase, it reneges on those promises. Today, the regime is devising yet another stratagem to sustain the old system, that is, to change enough to remain the same, notwithstanding that some attempts at change that are worth analyzing. This paper critically investigates the changes that have occurred since the hirak. The research questions are 1) whether the post-Bouteflika regime is willing to change, 2) whether it is concocting, as it did after the 1988 protests and temporary democratic opening, new instruments to preserve the old system. The paper also asks, does the hirak have any influence in forcing the regime to initiate genuine change? What are the political and economic instruments that the regime has introduced to gain legitimacy? The paper is grounded in decades of research on Algeria in-country and internationally and thousands of interviews, but the method is to engage senior Algerian officials, opposition leaders, and stakeholders with a new set of questions around regime cooptation methods, so well documented in Algeria. The author, located near Algeria, has been in regular communication with dozens of hirak activists, party members, officials in ministries, and high-ranking military officers throughout the pandemic and plans to return as soon as possible.