The democratization attempts of the authoritarian regime in Algeria resulted in the 1990s civil war. Since Bouteflika assumed power in 1999, his regime has sought to preserve the system in place since independence while personalizing it. Today, robustness and stability organized around sultanism characterizes the regime. The Arab uprisings had little impact on Algeria because the regime devised tactics to thwart potential protests and survive. However, little analysis has provided a compelling explanation of how and why Algeria has remained a stable and robust authoritarian regime. Undoubtedly, the regime succeeded in part because it concocted new mechanisms, such as superficial political liberalization and a deceptive multiparty system to hinder political and social contestations. The regime resorted to partial political liberalization as a palliative strategy, introducing only minimalist reforms that have done little to alter the nature of the political system and appeasing a population still terrified by the trauma of the 1990s. The regime has also managed the apparent multiparty system to create a façade of democratization that it can trumpet internationally. In fact, while offering a free, yet restricted, public space to the opposition and canalizing their activities into the institutional sphere, the regime still fixes electoral outcomes, manipulates the party system, and constrains the role of political parties, some of which it has coopted efficaciously. This strategy has guaranteed the stability and the robustness of the Algerian authoritarian regime. However, despite its soundness, this explanation remains insufficient. This paper proposes to revisit the concept of neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt; Clapham, and their critics) and ‘Sultanism’ (Weber; Linz; Leca & Vatin) and apply them to Algeria. The main proposition is that Bouteflika, who presents characteristics of a Sultan, has not only increased the robustness of the regime but has also set in motion neopatrimonial and sultanist patterns that have pervaded the system. This provides a conceivable explanation as to the current authorities’ inability to agree on a successor (despite Bouteflika’s debilitating illness) and to the standoff that prevents the emergence of a “second republic” through a break with the present system. Based on hundreds of interviews in Algeria and abroad, along with extensive analysis of primary and secondary sources, the paper will challenge Bouteflika’s partisans’ insistence on continuity by demonstrating that his twenty-year sultanist rule is replete with flagrant failures at all levels. Only a break with neopatrimonialism and sultanism can help Algeria make its transition to more democratic governance.