The Iranian reform era (1997-2004) presents a case rich with possibilities for cultural analysis in view of the salience of explicitly religious and nationalist ideological contention that centered on conflicting interpretations of Islam and the meaning of the Iranian Revolution during this period. Analyses that address the political culture of the reform era have tended to emphasize the role that the legacy of the Iranian Revolution played in empowering opposition elements seeking revision of the status quo, or else in buttressing the position of the conservative regime elements seeking to maintain it. While these analyses identify nationalist Islam and memory of the Revolution as cultural resources utilized by opposing sides in the contentious politics of the reform period, they do not fully explain why opposition groups were unsuccessful in their attempts to use these resources effectively to advance their political agendas. This paper uses a comparative methodology to offer a fuller explanation of the Iranian clerical elite’s success in dividing and dispersing political opposition during the reform period lasting between 1997-2004. Using the cases of Solidarity-era Poland and Revolutionary-era Iran, I carry out a structured comparison in order to identify key variables and causal processes that influenced outcomes in the case of reform-era Iran. I argue that reformist groups were unable to develop powerful unifying symbols to contest public space and push out the Khomeinists, because the wider Iranian political arena was dominated by the cultural legacy of the Iranian Revolution. The reformists were compelled to advance their civil society agenda using the language of nationalist Islam, the Revolution, and Khomeini himself, because these symbols, while subject to conflicting interpretations, nonetheless formed the essential foundation of contemporary Iranian political identity. Rejection and stigmatization of these symbols was (and remains) unthinkable, especially because the Western roots of the reformists’ liberalizing program left them exposed to accusations of foreign influence. Thus, reformists were compelled to operate within, rather than in opposition to, the hegemonic cultural discourse of the regime – in effect reinforcing the legitimacy of the institutions controlled by the conservative clergy. The study relies on a qualitative analysis of the writings, public statements, and speeches of Iranian leaders and opposition figures, translations of parliamentary debates, Iranian media reports, and the relevant secondary literatures.