God’s apprehension of particulars (juzʾiyāt) is often considered a pivotal issue in the history of Arabic philosophy and the development of Islamic thought. Its significance is attested as late as the turn of first Islamic millennium in a Mughal-Safavid debate, which invited a notable response from one of the leading Indian scholars at the time: ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkōtī (d. 1656). His treatment of the issue was backdropped by important commentarial engagements on the matter by the likes of Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī Taḥtānī (d. 1365), Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 1501/2), Mīr Ḥusayn Maybūdī (d. 1504), Mīrzajān Bāghnawī (d. 1587). Channeling them in his celebrated treatise, Siyālkōtī’s response served as a conduit for the postclassical development of the controversy over God’s knowledge. In addressing the philosophical, semantic, and theological challenges besetting the matter, Siyālkōtī makes a case for restating the contentious Avicennan posit that God apprehends particulars only in a universal manner (ʿalā wajh al-kull). After supplying the prerequisite account of God’s Knowledge of His own self/essence (dhāt), i.e., from which follows the very fact of His knowledge of particulars (i.e., of entities besides His own self), Siyālkōtī addresses the central question of the manner/state (kayfiyya) of God’s knowledge of particulars and their contingent aspects. He defends the view that while this knowledge is simple/partless (basīṭ) it is also "proactive" (fiʿlī) with respect to all things generated by God. This generative (mabdaʾī) relation allows for God’s presential (ḥuḍūrī) awareness of such entities to be, on the one hand, detailed/analytical (tafṣīlī) with respect to their specific features (ṣifāt; iʿtibārāt) as well as, on the other, based on and ultimately reducible to simple knowledge (ʿilm basīṭ). In this way God knows particulars in a universal manner insofar as the universality applies to the act/mode of knowledge, and not to the known particulars. After offering a resolution of competing views held between falsafa and kalām, Siyālkōtī also challenges Dawānī’s view that Avicenna was indecisive in his treatment of the issue. He concludes by revisiting Ghazālī’s famous “excommunication” of the falāsīfa on this count and offers fresh recourse. The paper in this vein concludes by deliberating on the status of falsafa and its relationship with kalām in the postclassical tradition.