In this paper, we seek to answer the important question of why some MPs seem to have room to maneuver around leadership and why others don’t. Utilizing a unique dataset of ideal point estimates on roll call votes in the TBMM, we’ve found is that there is far more variation within party MPs than one would initially suspect given the extant literature - particularly in the AKP. Despite the lack of intra-party democracy, a personalistic and unaccountable leadership, centralized nomination process, and opaque campaign finance structures - all thanks to the party law - it is clear that discipline in roll calls is not as strong as popularly assumed in the three largest party groups. In fact, our ideal point estimates show greater variation amongst MPs in the TBMM than MCs in the US Congress. We do not believe this is strictly a function of ideology. The first dimension of our scaling is very clearly defined by whether or not the party is in government. However, there is significant overlap. While ideology is likely a secondary or tertiary factor, the ideal points we estimate depart from other measurements of ideology based on expert surveys, party manifestos, and ideological scaling of voters, particularly in terms of ordering parties on a continuum. This suggests that the answer to our question lies in largely other attributes of MPs. Our analysis focuses primarily with the AKP, since they display the greatest variation. Within that party we see subtle variation between regions. We also see that many of the AKP “deviations” have independent means of political support which the MP could conceivably transfer to an independent candidacy or another party. These factors allow certain “free spirits” to circumvent the coercive mechanisms parties possess under Turkish law and political norms.