Few engineering projects in the nineteenth century have been more consequential than building the Suez Canal. The project, which led to a massive death toll as well as the indebtedness and eventual bankruptcy of the khedival government of Egypt, is often remembered as a precursor to the British occupation that followed. But closer scrutiny suggests otherwise. The middle decades of nineteenth century Egypt, during which the canal was built, were defined by the Ottoman province’s peculiar legal status. During the period, Egypt was neither a sovereign state, nor directly ruled by the Ottoman Empire, nor annexable to any other Empire. Opening the country to European capital therefore necessitated constructing a new commercial and legal domain. This ‘universal’ commercial domain was both external to Europe, and shaped by, yet equidistant from, the continent’s competing empires. Rather than being a prelude to British colonial rule, the universal domain, manifesting in the Compagnie Universelle du canal maritime de Suez, the Mixed Courts, and the Caisse de la dette publique, imposed strict limitations on British colonialism, and obstructed the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire. The Compagnie, formed by “capitalists of all nations,” managed by Europeans, and building a canal of “universal utility” was instrumental in consolidating this universal domain. In this paper, I study the indebtedness of the Egyptian government in the context of this universality. Both building the canal and the “right to borrow” were means of ascertaining the sovereignty of Egyptian rulers vis-à-vis Ottoman Sultans. The universal condition both produced and compromised the sovereignty of the viceregal government. While the indebtedness of the government, which eventually led to the establishment of the Caisse, expanded the universal domain to include the finances of the viceregal government, it consolidated the sovereignty of the viceregal government over local subjects.