On January 12, 2011, backed by its political allies in government, Hezbollah toppled down the cabinet so far headed by the anti-Syrian “14th of March” coalition. It then turned the Parliament in its advantage, by “converting” a sufficient number of MPs to its side, and had a new Prime Minister nominated to head a new government backed by a new parliamentarian majority. For the first time, Hezbollah is officially and openly the master of the political game in Lebanon. However, the seizure of power by Hezbollah was not a sudden event; it had been preceded by twenty years of activism on the Lebanese domestic scene, which progressively allowed the party to build a strong political practice and develop a relationship with the State and with power that remains quite unique, both in Lebanon and among Islamist groups. Unfortunately, this political dimension of the party has so far been neglected by scholars and analysts. Indeed, more than twenty-five years after its creation, Hezbollah remains a little understood organisation. It is commonly portrayed either as a military, regional player – through its wars with Israel – or as a proxy of the Syrian and/or Iranian regimes in Lebanon. No study, however, has thus far tried to address it as one of the most important political actors on the Lebanese domestic scene, for the last twenty years. This article intends to fill this gap. It proposes the first analytical model of Hezbollah’s relationship with power and with the State. Relying exclusively on primary sources (interviews, archives yet not used, participant observation), it first exposes Hezbollah’s theoretical and doctrinal understanding of politics and government. It then confronts, from both a sociological and a historical approach, that discourse to the party’s practice. Hence, this study will show that Hezbollah’s new position since January 2011 is less of a new shift in the party’s ideology and practice than a natural and consistent readjustment to what has been its mode of action since its very foundation.