Political Science and Security Studies literatures overwhelmingly adopt state-centric analytical approaches that make binary distinctions between opposition parties and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) concerning what constitutes a threat to the state. Whether underpinned by the concepts of Hobbes, Weber, or Tilly, the centrality of the state means that it alone can possess the ability to kill as it guarantees the security of its polity, maintains its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and protects itself from those who might commit violence against it. If an NSAG holds any political aspirations they have to demonstrate to the state that they no longer harbor any revolutionary desires, with the state demanding they renounce the use of violence, accept the existing political, social, and economic status quo, and agree to work through elections and parliamentary procedures before gaining access to political power. However, for some NSAGs, like Palestine’s Hamas, the stipulation concerning their use of violence is seemingly placed into abeyance. Hamas created a political party that successfully engages in institutional/electoral politics, while Hamas’s armed wing concurrently uses violence to challenge Israel’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. As studies of these so-called hybrid movements explicate, they characterise themselves as resistance/national liberationist movements who make decisions to employ violent and non-violent resistance strategies, often simultaneously, depending on the prevailing circumstances and how they believe they can best achieve organisational objectives. However, with the hybrid-movement literature blinkered by its Hobbesian/Weberian conceptual confines, the exact nature of the relationship between a movement’s political and armed wings, particularly concerning the role that the use and non-use of violence plays in a movement’s organisational narrative, remains largely unexplored and thus indeterminate. This paper aims to address this lacuna by using the four wars Hamas has fought with Israel since 2006 as case studies. Thus, the paper provides a nuanced understanding of this relationship and the corresponding role that violence plays in Hamas’s strategic narrative post-2005 by revealing the existence of a far more synergistic connection between the two wings than is acknowledged in the literature. The paper argues that the principal objective of this synergism is not to topple Israel’s occupation regime in the Palestinian territories, nor to destabilise or overthrow the Palestinian political system, but to ensure that Hamas remains a viable political actor and maintains its political voice in the broader Palestinian resistance debate.