Questions about the economy and the structure of economic power in the Arab region after the 2011 uprisings remain relatively unexplored by scholars. This paper is part of a project that focuses on the economic dimensions of the Arab uprisings—both its antecedents and those that now shape ongoing transitions in the region. Noting the centrality of economic grievances underlying the 2011 protests, many observers anticipated that old and emerging political actors would focus on redressing such grievances through new policies and initiatives. Such actions though have been stymied by domestic and international obstacles. Activists pushing for more inclusive economic policies have been marginalized and in some cases, excluded altogether from discussions with international and regional donors. Scholars evaluating current economic reform efforts note their resemblance to those associated with previous regimes. After revolution, how should we understand this surprising continuity? In this paper, I examine post 2011 economic changes through the lens of past colonial history in the Middle East to understand the obstacles facing those challenging the present economic order in the region. Economic historians have examined ways in which debt served as a form of colonization, restructuring elite politics and institutions. Leveraging field and archival work and current financial intelligence on debt, taxes, and trade in Morocco since the early 20th century, I build on that work to show how new forms of such colonialism have evolved through loan agreements sponsored by donor governments and international organizations. Drawing on Drezner and McNamara’s (2013) notion of global financial orders, my work explains the persistence of structures favoring particular elites, the mechanics and consequences of international financial markets in the region and why avenues for expansive economic reform therein remain constrained. My research builds on previous scholarship within international relations on the concept of hierarchy and coercion and links that with the literatures examining transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe to think about the historical role of assistance in reinforcing power relations, how authority is maintained, and how aid can coerce outcomes in what Lake has called “manipulating incentives” through assistance to constrain state behavior in building a new architecture of aid and security in the region.