IDENTITY CRISIS? POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN JORDAN At least in relative terms, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has appeared to be placid and stable amidst the revolutions, coups, and civil wars of the regional ‘Arab Spring.’ But while Jordan has, so far, avoided the more violent politics that have engulfed so many countries in the region, politics within the kingdom is by no means placid. Most alarmingly for the regime, Tribal East Jordanian youth are among the most politically restive and angry forces within Jordanian politics. Other more traditional forms of opposition – including leftist parties and the kingdom’s large Islamist movement (ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to a revitalized Salafi movement) – have also taken to the streets to oppose the regime. This suggests the potential for a broad-ranging opposition coalition. Yet divisions continue to hamper collective action, preventing a truly united opposition front. This paper examines identity politics as the key wedge dividing Jordanian political opposition and at times Jordanian society more broadly. Jordanian politics seems to continually return to debates over “who is really Jordanian?” This concern has been continually refueled by matters as diverse as the Syrian civil war, the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and even local legislation regarding children’s rights. Today in Jordanian politics, seemingly every debate and crisis leads back to identity politics. Methods: This paper draws the author's own extensive field research in Jordan (most recently in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014) to investigate Jordan's continual identity crisis. My field research includes interviews ranging from opposition activists to government officials and even King Abdullah II himself. Conclusions: This paper argues that identity politics remains a trump card within Jordanian politics that still manages to divide even the largest and broadest possible opposition coalitions. For the opposition to be effective, it needs to take the initiative itself to address a more pluralistic and inclusive vision of Jordanian identity. If it fails to do so, it will forever remain susceptible to divide and rule tactics as well as its own internally-generated divisions, rendering all its other efforts at mobilization futile. Panels? If accepted, this paper could fit with a diverse range of panels, including identity politics, democracy, reform, government and opposition, or papers on the 'Arab Spring' in general.