In Relocating Middle Powers, A. Cooper, et al., proposed that “pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, preferring compromise positions in international disputes and embracing notions of good international citizenship constitute the typical behavior of a middle power.” In 1996, P. Kennedy, et al., developed the concept of “pivotal states,” i.e., states, including Algeria, which have the aptitude to influence regional and international stability and which are so important regionally that their collapse would result in largescale chaos. Since the end of the black decade in the 1990s and its resurgence as a key regional and international actor, Algeria has been defined as a “middle power,” a “regional power,” or as a “pivotal state.” These categorizations derive in part from the fact that Algeria is the largest country in Africa and boasts important primary and military resources. In spite of this tremendous capacity, Algerian policymakers refrain from articulating a military doctrine that would reexamine the long-held principles of noninterference that have prevented them from defending more effectively the country’s interests in both the Maghrebi and Sahelian neighborhoods. While the security forces have been quite effective in neutralizing Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State domestically, decision-makers have been obstinately unwilling to intervene militarily outside the country’s borders or even to launch hot-pursuits against terrorist groups, actions which could strengthen the country’s security. While the authorities have offered their mediation in several conflicts (Libya, Tunisia, Mali…), they have rejected counsel from great powers to play a mightier regional role as a military power. The proposed paper seeks to elucidate the main elements and reasons for Algeria’s reluctance to become a genuine regional power through a thorough analysis of its security policy in the Maghreb-Sahel. The contention to be tested is that while Algeria is unquestionably a middle power, it has nonetheless refrained from acting as a pivotal state. The paper will look at competing security strategies within Algeria’s establishment. Elucidating the reasons for such reluctance will make a contribution to the study of Algeria’s foreign and security policy and unveil some of its determinants. It will rely on extensive multi-year fieldwork in Algeria, including interviews with several dozen of high officials in the Algerian national security and foreign policy establishment, writings of Algerian and foreign analysts and academics, as well as the literature on middle powers and on rivalries.