Until 2013, the Gülen Movement (GM) had opened more than 100 schools in about 50 countries on the African continent. Its followers (businessmen, lobbyists, teachers, imams), constituted a Turkish diaspo-ra aiming at promoting what they defined as a Turkish understanding of an Islamic ethic. In doing so, this diaspora benefited from the support of the AKP government, who, in parallel, launched a Foreign Policy of “Opening up to Africa” from 2003. Turkish public actors and the private actors of the GM were thus collaborating in a network of action aiming at increasing the Turkish share on the African continent. However, following a conflict emerging in Turkey starting from December 2013, and especially after the failed coup attributed to the GM on 15 July 2016, this strategic alliance came to an end and the conflict became an international one. The followers became an ‘undesired diaspora’ (Turner & Kleist, 2013) and the Turkish government took initiatives to extend its anti-Gulen policy to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Turkish government pressured African states to transfer the Gülen schools to the Turkish semi-public agency, the Maarif Foundation. In Senegal, the eight schools were among the most expensive and top-ranked of the country. Yet, paradoxically, Senegalese authorities accepted to transfer them to the Maa-rif Foundation, unleashing protests of segments of the Senegalese population. This case study examines the evolution of Turkey’s regime of governmentality beyond its own frontiers, through the way it handles its “undesired diaspora”. It also investigates the ways a transnational social movement based on secrecy and informality can reinvent itself (and be reinvented) through local re-appropriations in Senegal. This paper relies upon a multi-sited field research conducted between 2014 and 2016 (before the coup attempt of 15 July 2016) in Turkey and Senegal in the framework of a PhD research focusing on the circulations of Turks and Africans in the GM. Interviews and participant observation were conducted both in Turkey and in Senegal in universities, schools, religious dialogue platforms, business associations belonging to the GM as well as with Turkish and Senegalese state officials (TIKA, Diplomats, and Minis-ter of Religious Affairs). After 15 July 2016, I relied largely upon a non-systematic review of Turkey’s and Senegal’s web, press and TV media coverage of the post-failed coup events.