This paper aims to explain why the processes of consolidating transitions have taken different shapes in two Arab Spring countries: Egypt and Tunisia. Studies that seek to explain the challenges facing Arab Spring countries mostly rely on cultural, economic or external factors (e.g. socio-economic difficulties, existence of a predominantly conservative culture, lack of historical democratic experience; unsupportive regional and international factors, etc.), but they largely overlook elite behavior. The proposed study thus asks in how far inter-elite trust can help explain the differentiated democratization paths in Egypt and Tunisia in the three years following the removal of their former rulers. By measuring and explaining variations of trust among the party elites in both countries – through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods – we argue that post-Mubarak’s Egypt has been facing more serious challenges than post-Ben Ali’s Tunisia because inter-elite trust has been comparatively lower in the former. Our theoretical framework rests on two main arguments. Firstly, that in many ways, a successful transition depends on a reasonable degree of inter-elite trust, as it is this trust that facilitates the kind of compromises and consensus-building behavior necessary for any stable transition. Secondly, that several institutional and structural factors have contributed to creating a differentiated level of inter-elite trust in Egypt and Tunisia – some of them date back to the pre-transition era. Concerning our use of data, a triangulation approach is employed. Data collection is done through a mix of elite interviews, an elite survey of relevant politicians as well as text analysis of party press releases, party press as well as of other relevant media. The purpose here is to gauge the extent and reasons of the negative image of opponents (mostly ordered along the Islamist –non-Islamist division line) in both countries.