Egypt’s local popular committees emerged in response to governance vacuums in urban spaces following the January 25th uprising. While some scholars stressed the unprecedented spontaneous growth of these committees (Bremer 2011), others pointed to their shared patterns of continuity with earlier forms of ‘non-movement’ activism in popular areas (Harders 2013). Notwithstanding the significance of this emerging debate, scholars have unanimously hailed popular committees as a grassroots democratizing force. Yet little comparative empirical work has been done on the actual patterns and evolution of this unique form of activism in revolutionary times, or on its impact on residents. What are the characteristics of popular committees as a form of activism? Specifically, what are their internal structures and claims to legitimacy? What accounts for the strategies they adopted vis a vis state authorities?And, finally, how far have these strategies served to fundamentally restructure urban governance dynamics? Based on original fieldwork conducted in 2013-2014, my comparative analysis of three neighborhoods in Greater Cairo (Ard El Lewa, Imbaba and Omraneya) shows that committees diverged in their ideological framings, internal organizations, relations with political actors and civil society groups, as well as collective forms of action vis a vis state authorities. Contrary to the social movements literature, I propose that a higher degree of informalization is not necessarily positively correlated with the adoption of more radical repertoires. Rather, ideological framings and links to outside actors, particularly the media and political parties, seem to shape committees’ strategies. Additionally, focus group discussions with residents showed skeptical views on the future role of neighborhood committees in local governance. With the exception of youth in the 17-25 age group, residents displayed widespread ambivalence with regards to democratic decentralization reforms. I suggest that among other things, activists’ framings, as well as weak alliances with political parties and social movements explain the committees overall inability to create sustainable momentum for decentralization reforms and participatory urban governance in the post-Mubarak era.