For decades two prevailing trends in Egypt have influenced the status of religious minorities: a liberal trend that recognizes the crucial role of minorities in constructing a pluralistic society, and an Islamist trend that has a puritanical and exclusionary vision of society. Islamism has contributed to sectarian tensions and violence since 1972, when the growth of conservative ideologies and constitutional changes under President Anwar Sadat marked the beginning of long-term deprivation of minorities from religious freedom. This paper categorizes the hundreds of incidents of sectarian violence involving Muslims and Christians into three main clusters: 1) Socio-Religious Issues, 2) Political Issues, and 3) Economic Issues. Problematically, successive governments have not provided a proper mechanism to resolving sectarian tensions. Instead they have limited the visibility of minorities. They have required official permits for church construction, and have not permitted Shia Muslims and Baha’is to have their own places of worship. Security forces have often encouraged customary reconciliatory meetings outside the jurisdiction of the courts. This paper argues that systematic discrimination toward religious minorities has rendered them second-class citizens. According to Valentine Moghadam, revolutions can either result in “inclusionary” or “exclusionary” policies. In the case of Egypt, post-revolutionary politics did not improve minority status. Emboldened Islamists increasingly spoke of Christians and Shias as enemies of Islam. Because Christians supported the June 30th mass demonstrations and the military coup, systematic violence targeted their churches, schools, institutions, cultural centers, shops and homes. The recurrence of attacks on churches, forced displacement of Christians, and accusations of contempt for religion demonstrate the urgent need for state policies that foster national integration of minorities. The alternative would be sectarianized religious identities and a diminishing Christian population, as has happened in Iraq and Syria and reported by scholars such as Reza Aslan and Paul Sedra. Will a new post-revolutionary government develop a transformative agenda to address religious discrimination and unresolved sectarian tensions, or will there be structural factors that resist change? To address this question, the paper will examine the role of the state, the role of religious leaders, and the level of importance the majority places on a pluralistic Egyptian society. Methodologically, I completed fieldwork in Egypt between March and November 2013, and over 116 in-depth interviews with politicians, security personnel, church and mosque leaders, Shias and Baha’is, victims of sectarian strife, activists, and members of human rights organizations and civil society.