This paper examines the evolution of social dialogue institutions in Lebanon and Tunisia between 2010 and 2017. Both countries faced critical junctures, but their institutions pursued divergent courses. The national social dialogue institution was revamped in Tunisia to increase participation in policymaking, whereas it was reinstated in Lebanon without addressing its institutional flaws. By building on these developments, this paper makes two theoretical contributions. First, it argues that the nature of political interference in organized labour prior to the critical juncture influences its subsequent role. Labour neutralisation in Lebanon was founded on sectarian politics that co-opted national leadership and bound rank-and-file to sectarian clientelism. Labour pacification in Tunisia harmed executives, whereas local unionists remained independent. After the critical juncture, Tunisian organized labour revitalized itself, aided by rank-and-file autonomy. It then made a strategic choice to reconsolidate the tripartite system with enhanced involvement of the traditional labour and capital organisations in policymaking. Lebanese organized labour was unchallenged by its rank-and-file. It maintained ties with political elites. Second, these paths illustrate the differences between social contracts. Participation in policy elaboration is among the deliverables exchanged between political elites and social actors in Tunisia but not in Lebanon.