The Palestinian Authority (PA) - established in 1994 as a product of a Joint Declaration of Principles (1993) between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel - was intended to be an interim body to govern Palestinians in the occupied territories until the institution of a ‘two-state solution’. However, while the ‘peace process’ stalled the PA continued to operate as de facto government, responsible for Palestinians under occupation but lacking sovereignty. From its inception the PA acted as a ‘Bully Pretorian Republic’ (Henry and Springborg 2010), providing rents and services in exchange for support from its constituents. However, this led to the accumulation of power and wealth by a small group of already influential elites (Hanieh 2011) while at the same time, and in the context of the occupation and of economic de-development (Roy 2006), the general population grew ever more disenfranchised and disenchanted by this arrangement (Bouillon 2004). Hamas' actions as spoiler, combined with increasing Israeli obduracy, added to the PA’s problems and, by 2000, it was unable to maintain control. Al-Aqsa intifada followed (2000-c.2007) and, in the context of extreme violence, the PA’s institutions were exposed as weak. In 2006, Hamas won legislative elections, partly by capitalising on a record of coping better under those conditions (Gordon and Flic 2009). A factional schism followed and the PA’s establishment returned to power in the West Bank with the support of western intelligence agencies (Rose 2008; Black and Milne 2011). Yet despite overturning the democratic will of the population the PA’s imposition of order after al-Aqsa intifada has been interpreted generally as a success. Not only did the PA consolidate its power in the West Bank and restore good relations with Israel and the West, it also appeared to obtain popular legitimacy by cracking down on its political opponents. This paper discusses the impact of events in Nablus, which had endured lawlessness and disorder under an Israeli siege (2001-7) and was then the focus of the PA’s security agenda. It argues that, though the PA’s security agenda initially enjoyed popular consent, it did not demonstrate public endorsement of the PA’s legitimacy. Rather it is more likely that such consent was a product of extreme violence in recent history and the restoration of some basic services. This conclusion has profound implications for the understanding of legitimacy in relation to authoritarian and democratic governance in Palestine.