Militaries are known to be influenced by their country’s respective culture in terms of mindset, ideological goals, and sources of motivation. Military men, especially the rank and file, are motivated by ideals and values that are endeared by the civilians at large, are motivated by what also motivates a considerable part of the population, and think as average co-citizens do. The very structure of military organizations, however, is not expected to be influenced by varying cultural values, habits, and ideals, as standards of military efficiency are relatively global. I argue that by assuming and consolidating an unconventional organization through the Iran-Iraq War in a relatively successful manner, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) defied this pattern. The IRGC was initially established as a militia to maintain internal security after the 1979 revolution in Iran. It was neither equipped and trained, nor structured in the model of a classical Army to fight a conventional war. In the havoc that followed the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September1980, the IRGC became involved in the defense effort alongside the Iranian regular Army, but only unofficially and on a small scale. It was only one year later that the government finally recognized the IRGC as a military force to be deployed as the Iranian Army’s coequal and granted it more financial and political support. Relying on 35 in-depth interviews with IRGC veterans and officers, I demonstrate that even as it took the shape of a professional military, the IRGC preserved its particular cultural traits as the entity’s organizing principles. The informal structure that it had assumed by relying on preexisting religious networks continued to run the organization even under the pressure of a conventional battle. Leaders were respected not because of their rank, but based on their charismatic spirituality. Until the end of the war, as a matter of fact, insignias were not introduced into the IRGC. In addition, what kept the flow of volunteers, i.e. one of the IRGC’s winning cards, consistent despite the massive casualties was the fact that volunteers found the IRGC’s informal leadership and risky operational style more compatible with their ideal of Islamic brotherly love, whole-hearted dedication to the ideological cause, and revolutionary direct action—as opposed to the Army’s conservative, calculated treatment of the battle condition.