This paper examines the contested connections between Ottoman monetary policies and commercial credit transactions to see how creditors and debtors attempted to sway state monetary policies and how these polices in turn mediated credit relations. Although money and credit are often seen as parallel systems of exchange, with credit substituting for cash in currency-scarce markets, the terms of credit transactions were set in the language of a currency. Therefore, through their monetary policies, the Ottoman state had to balance the interests of creditors with the predicament of debtors. Debasements and inflationary policies over the term of a contract could leave creditors with a loss. Similarly, “crying down” the value of a coin caused debtors to face nearly unsurmountable bills. In other words, early modern credit relations amplified patterns of advantage propagated by the politics surrounding money. To combat disadvantageous monetary policies, different factions within Ottoman society—debtors, creditors, salaried soldiers, regional governors, and shopkeeper—endeavored to sway state policies. Unpopular debasements sometimes contributed to the overthrowing of sultans while newly-crowned sultans often restored the value coins to garner support from creditors. In keeping with the panel’s goal of complicating narratives of clear-cut state power, this paper argues that Ottoman monetary policy was the consequence of competing interests from across Ottoman society. Next, this paper presents a case study of Anglo-Ottoman credit relations in order to examine how Ottoman monetary policies complicated trans-imperial credit relations as the web of credit was expanding globally. This case study therefore contributes to the panel’s investigation of the challenges and possibilities of connecting Ottoman and European political economy. In the early modern Ottoman market, British merchants confronted a heterodox monetary environment where Venetian ducats, Spanish pieces of eight, Dutch lion thalers, and Polish isolettes circulated alongside the Ottoman akçe and kuru?. In their credit transactions, merchants would often specify how payment should be made in a mix of currencies rather than relying on the stability of any one currency. Even with these provisions, uncertainty over the Ottoman currency’s stability could still suspend credit entirely. When conflicts arose over the quality and value of different coins, however, both Ottoman and British merchants relied on Ottoman courts to resolve their disputes. By investigating their treatment of these debt disputes, we can discover how the Ottoman legal system confronted the common and persistent problem of how to balance the possibilities of credit and the perils of debt.