After Hamas gained military control over Gaza through the fighting with Fateh in 2007, the split with Fateh/PA in Ramallah became almost insurmountable. However, during Israel’s war against Gaza 2008/2009, the relationship between the two movements changed to a degree forcing us to question the assumption of an insurmountable split. For despite this split since 2007, Fateh’s field leaders in Gaza and Hamas joined forces to resist the Israeli army when it attacked Gaza. Still, Fateh’s clientelist elites in Ramallah supported the colonial occupation by blaming Hamas and accusing it of being at least partially responsible for Israel’s war and even its war crimes in Gaza. This paper will analyze in depth the reasons which led to this “split” inside Fateh between the armed Fateh forces in Gaza who joined in with Hamas, and the political elites in Ramallah, who took the opposite position blaming and criticizing Hamas even in the middle of the war. The question which results from this analysis will obviously be if this inner-Fateh split could deepen, leading to a Gaza-Fateh and a Ramallah-Fateh. Another scenario might be an inner-Fateh revolt against the clientelist and collaborationist Fateh/PA elite in Ramallah. And the last scenario, obviously, would be a return to the pre-war situation with the major conflict being between Hamas and Fateh over internal Palestinian leadership. Therefore, the central research question of this paper is: what will be stronger in the long run, the challenge of the occupation (which might re-unite Fateh and Hamas, as happened on the ground in Gaza), or the never-ending process of negotiations with the occupation, cementing the rule of the Ramallah Fateh/PA elite and the split between Fateh and Hamas. To answer this question, it is crucial to explore the undergoing transformations within the Fateh movement, which undoubtedly contribute in shaping the different political decisions of its rentier elite and its field leaders. In addition, for an accurate understanding of the conflict in the context of the rentier-clientelist system, it is essential to investigate beyond the Israeli colonial context, i.e. to analyze the post-colonial policies adopted by international actors intervening in the conflict. This paper uses both the study of colonialism and of post-colonialism and its concomitant methodologies. Also, because the Palestinian case is an extremely complex case, it can only be understood by a deconstruction of existing power relations.