Emboldened by a military coup in Egypt, Tunisians in the summer of 2013 took to the streets in mass explicitly calling for a “repeat of the Egyptian scenario.” Why did the Tunisian military not follow the Egyptian military’s lead in ousting the Islamist-led government? This paper disputes the three most common explanations: that the Tunisian military was too weak, too professional, or that there were insufficient calls for a coup. Rather, the long-marginalized Tunisian military had finally begun to see its institutional interests enhanced and thus had no incentive to stage a coup. Most scholars argue that the Tunisian military lacked the capacity for a coup. Yet cross-nationally, its number of soldiers per capita fell close to the median of all countries that have experienced coups. Interviews with retired Tunisian generals likewise suggest that the military had more than enough strength to suppress any anti-coup protests. Jebnoun (2014) and Brooks (2016) argue that the Tunisian military was too professional to get involved in politics. This explanation overlooks the fact that military officers plotted coups in 1962 and 1987, staged a coup in 1987, and enjoyed significant political influence after Ben Ali’s ouster, particularly armed forces chief of staff Rachid Ammar. Retired officers interviewed also considered a short political intervention and handover of power to civilian authorities a legitimate response to chaos in the streets. Finally, Masoud (2015) argues that Tunisians did not call for a coup in sufficient numbers. Yet representatives of every major opposition party called for a repeat of Egypt. The World Values Survey (WVS) also reports substantial support for military rule in 2013, above the median for countries for which WVS data is available prior to a coup. Retired officers confirmed that the military felt significant pressure from the public to intervene. This paper contends that the primary reason there was no coup in Tunisia was because the majority of the officer corps had seen their personal and institutional interests enhanced by the troika government. Democratization brought the military a larger budget, more weapons deals, greater influence over national security decisions, political appointments as governors, and an end to the privileging of officers from the Sahel. As a Sahelian complicit in the military’s historical marginalization, General Rachid Ammar lacked sufficient support within the military to organize a coup.