In this paper, I explore the effects of civil war territorial control on post-war local politics in Lebanon. Why have pre-war local elites regained their power in certain neighborhoods while others continue to be dominated by wartime players? I argue that consolidating control over territory is a strategic imperative for armed groups contesting a civil war. In order to accomplish this, armed groups can change the composition of the population within the territory, displacing out-group members and attracting displaced in-group members with the promise of security. These vulnerable in-group IDPs have been detached from their local networks, making them likely supporters of groups that offer security. An armed group can also try to win over the remaining population living in the territory, providing security and services in exchange for loyalty and local information. These relationships of exchange are established through the cooptation of local elites and their networks. I argue that these original residents (in contrast to IDPs), while they may also support the armed group, have strong attachments to pre-war local elites. These strategies have consequences for the post-war local balance of power. If the armed group that controls a territory wins the war, it monopolizes the political space. Local elites must either be subordinate to its political directives or risk marginalization. Displaced “new” residents that have direct links to the party will be relatively more empowered. In contrast, if the controlling armed group is defeated, it will be unable to continue monopolizing the locality’s political space. In the vacuum left after the group’s defeat, local elites will function more independently. In this context, “original” residents that have strong links to local elites will be just as, if not more, empowered than displaced “new” residents. I test these hypotheses with data from Lebanon. First, I investigate the strategies used by armed groups to consolidate territorial control. I examine whether there is a relationship between displacement, resettlement, and assistance from armed groups. I use results from a nationally representative survey of 50,000 households conducted in 1987. Then, I undertake a micro-level study of two Beirut suburbs. Both came under armed group control during the war. One suburb’s controlling armed group won the the war. The other lost. Through thirty in-depth interviews with local elites and residents, I investigate the relationship between wartime players and local elites and compare the role of “new” and “original” residents in both communities.