Fundamental changes are underway in contemporary Turkish politics as attested by the recent reconfiguration of the Kemalist discourses within the leadership of Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) that traditionally identified itself as the guardian of the Republic and its secular-nationalist values. One of the central debates within the political and public discourse today revolves around the deconstruction of the framework of Turkishness and Turkish nationalism. In the post-Ottoman Republican era, the military-bureaucratic elite implemented a project of state and nation-building through marginalizing Islam under the control of the state (secularism) and through assimilating different ethnic groups into newly constructed Turkish identity (nationalism). However, this alleged new social glue of secular-modern Turkishness has never had strong cultural, economic, and political grounds because of the nature of "revolution-from-above" trait of the Republic. Although any religious or religio-ethnic oppositions were relatively suppressed until the 1950s, the inevitable outcome of the revival of alternative identities based on religion and ethnicity against the official identity of the Republic was under way after the 1960s. One of the strongest challenges to the official identity has been the politicization of Kurdish identity which has transformed into a strong Kurdish nationalism against its Turkish variant. Today, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, with its Islamic roots and the widespread Kurdish identity consciousness, forces the Kemalist discourse for serious changes in identifying Turkishness. Besides, debates on religion and its place in public life and the interaction between Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism have an important aspect of rethinking a new social contract in Turkey. Despite the roots of Kurdish nationalism within the Kemalist project, today, there exists a vicious cycle of stimulating extremist polarizations between Turkish and Kurdish identities within this interaction of dual nationalism in Turkey. Then, the research question, here, first deals with the possible direction of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism through looking at the contemporary discourses of both sections. The second goal is to project the possibilities on how to moderate both nationalisms in order to create a new "us" from the established lines "us" (Turks) vs. "them" (Kurds) under "the nationalism of Turkey" rather than exclusive Turkish or Kurdish nationalism. With that regards, I will observe the recent historical discourses of Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism in order to see if there is a space for moderation and combination within the clamped vicious cycle of these two conflicting nationalisms.