Jordan lies at the epicenter of a fragmenting Arab state system and the changing regional order. Its government is semi-autocratic with pervading attributes of neo-patrimonialism and the security state, both of which have led to a fragile civil society. This paper examines Jordan’s emerging social entrepreneurship scene. Briefly, social entrepreneurship refers to the employment of business-like tactics to achieve primarily social goals. The ‘ecosystem’ for social enterprises in the country is nascent, but they nevertheless constitute an important part of the country’s civil society that deserves investigation. International organizations and foreign governments alike have championed social entrepreneurship in Jordan because they see it as a promising vehicle for economic prosperity and citizen participation leading to greater state stability. In addition, entrepreneurship promotion efforts seek to address the various concerns raised by Jordan’s “youth bulge.” Much of the existing literature discussing social entrepreneurship in the Middle East takes a positive and hopeful approach; in contrast, this paper presents a critical review of its actual functions and the system within which it operates. Based on over forty semi-structured interviews which took place from January to April 2018, the paper first discusses, briefly, the types of social entrepreneurs and their respective objectives, functions, and challenges. Secondly, the paper investigates whether social entrepreneurship can act as an effective and independent agent of social change, rather than constituting an extension of the monarchy’s realm of influence. The paper explores Western governments’ and INGOs’ influence on social enterprises through material and immaterial support, and discusses the ways in which the Jordanian regime uses soft power through bureaucratic obstacles, oversight, a foreign funding control mechanism, and in some cases co-optation to manage and control the work of social enterprises. In this context, the paper outlines how financial independence, the use of social capital, and official registration as a company rather than a non-governmental organization can increase a social enterprise’s chances of achieving its objectives without external interference and functioning as a truly community-responsive organization, rather than beholden to the demands of the regime and the international community. The paper concludes that only select few social enterprises can achieve this, and that most are ultimately extensions of the regime’s neopatrimonial rule and the international community’s desire to uphold neoliberal institutions and Jordanian stability.

Encouraged by western donors, Arab regimes have introduced decentralization reforms as a means to enhance local autonomy, increase political participation and improve their economic situation ever since the 1990s. Yet, when tackling questions on authoritarian regime stability in the Middle East, scholars focused on central elites and state institutions, neglecting the significance of the local level. Only when the Arab protests in 2011 mostly originated from the local periphery, political scientists increasingly began to employ a bottom-up perspective and turned their attention to the dynamics of local politics. In 2015, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan joined the trend by introducing a law on decentralization as an initial step towards a decentralized governing structure. The most significant change coming with this top-down initiated reform project is the establishment of a governorate council in each of Jordan’s twelve governorates – a (partly) elected, financially independent body, which is now working as an intermediate player between the center and the local tiers of government. In general, the functioning of decentralization in the Arab world is subject to elite networks on all levels: central, intermediate and local. In turn, decentralization reforms also affect the formation and the logic behind these elite networks by providing new opportunities for local elites and other stakeholders to evolve. This paper provides a systematic account of the state of decentralization in Jordan and identifies changing dynamics within central, intermediate, and local elite networks triggered by the process. Drawing on the findings of extensive field work in Jordan in 2018, the paper gives answers to the following questions: Are decentralized government structures enhancing central control in the periphery by reinforcing central elite networks on the intermediate and local levels of government? Does decentralization develop its own momentum by opening up new “spaces of contentious politics” and thereby give way to unpredictable bottom-up dynamics? Based on a most dissimilar systems design, the empirical analysis of three governorates sheds light on changing elite dynamics, possible regional disparities and future prospects for decentralization in Jordan. The underlying theoretical framework builds up on an interplay between top-down initiated decisions and bottom-up activities. Top-down initiated decisions include formal mechanisms of political participation, e.g. elections, as well as informal practices such as cooptation. Simultaneously, the new role of the intermediate level opens up the possibility for formal and informal bottom-up dynamics to evolve, creating new “spaces of contentious politics”.

The dynamism of the 2011-12 uprisings in Jordan was in large part due to the role of East Bank tribal youths—collectively referred to as the Hirak. This stemmed from the fact that they represented the geographic and tribal pillars of the monarchy; a social base of the regime dating all the way back to its founding. Yet, as recent scholarship shows, the path of the Hirak was paved by the activism of teachers, phosphate workers, day-wage laborers, and port workers as early as 2002. These workers conducted the strikes, sit-ins, and labor protests that broke the barrier of fear in Jordan and set the terms of further protest. Lacking the political significance of the Hirak, workers instead relied on their economic leverage. This paper argues that these two movements—labor and youth—represent two sides of the same coin: a youth-labor alliance. Such alliances were not unique to Jordan; indeed, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were also characterized by the intersection of youth and labor movements. This begs the question: How was it that individuals separated, in many instances, by class, geography, and ethnicity were drawn together into a national social movement? Through a case study of Jordan, I argue that patterns of neoliberal reform produced spatially uneven distributions of deprivation and dispossession that united otherwise disparate parts of Jordanian society while drawing from different wells of social power. Neoliberal practices rearranged urban spaces, privatized state assets, and sectioned the country into free economic zones—dramatically transforming the relationship between society and the state in the process. This produced a through-line of economic grievances that were articulated initially by localized labor activists, legitimized by early victories against the state, and which remained hegemonic as politically-minded but less experienced youth activists came on the scene. This paper draws on original interviews across Jordan with labor and youth activists, private sector actors, experts, current and former government officials and politicians conducted over one year of fieldwork in Jordan. I demonstrate how spatial patterns of neoliberal reform assembled the—often contradictory and fragile—youth-labor alliance that characterized the 2011-12 Arab uprisings in Jordan. The implications of this research extend into the present moment. Indeed, since the spatially uneven consequences of neoliberalism continue to be felt by young and working Jordanians, the potential for another youth-labor alliance remains.

In spite of its integrative function, its ability to unite people and shape identities, and its contributions to peacebuilding and international development, sport has sometimes been a tool to divide groups and create identity tension. In the case of Jordan, soccer is not just a game; it goes far beyond that. It is a battleground. It is no longer a social phenomenon that contributes to the psychological health of the Jordanian society, it actually erodes the social and cultural fabric. This study provides the results of a 7-year longitudinal research of the role of sports in Jordan and how it fuels the national identity among ethnic Jordanians and Jordanian Palestinians. Drawing from 56 semi-structured interviews, archival work, media and social media, and personal experience, this article investigates the lifelong tension, and identity division has thus been existed between the two groups. The analysis stems from a detailed account of a rival history between two soccer teams and their fans. I argue that the blatant, sometimes overt, national identity-driven conflict between the two sides plays in the interests of the government, stabilizes the Hashemite regime, and shifts the attention of both parties from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The analysis shows that, despite the fact that the two entities have been living together for decades, their national identities are on the borderline and source of conflict. This analysis is used to develop an analytical framework to further investigate the relationship between sports and identity conflict. This study advances the Value-Added Theory and the Social Identity Theory of intergroup behavior by stressing upon the relationship between collective behavior and forming social identity. The findings demonstrate that identity division is ingrained in the culture. This division is passed to generations through parents’ and grandparents’ narratives as “us vs. them”. Also, the two sides’ changing identity is a circumstantial phenomenon. In other words, their identities are shaped by a torn social fabric when the two teams play. Yet, this identity division fades away when the discussion comes to Israel. Interestingly enough, it seems that Jordanian Monarch is happy with this division given the two sides’ history.

As wars and violent conflicts devastated Iraq and Syria, neighboring Amman emerged as a center for producing, exhibiting and circulating contemporary art. With the influx of Iraqi artist and investors, followed by Syrian cultural producers a new market for cultural products has emerged. The number of art galleries in Amman more than tripled, new cultural institutions emerged, and older neighborhoods quickly gentrified. The actors who took part in these urban transformations are upper and middle-class women. In this paper I look at role of women artists and gallery directors in Amman as producers and consumers of cultural products. I examine the emerging art scene in Amman through the lenses of urban space and gender (while venturing into the anthropology of art). Studies on urban Middle East tend to focus on the underprivileged Muslim communities, which marginalized the work on secular communities, intellectuals, and the urban upper-middle class. More specifically, it further obscured the ignored group: educated, intellectual, and secular women who manifest Western modes of agency and play a crucial role in cultural exchange between regional cities. I view these women as contributors to the cultural and intellectual landscape of Amman: they produce and circulate knowledge; distribute art; enable social networks and social gatherings; and influence aesthetics standards by redefining the urban public sphere. Thus, they provide a multi-faceted case for thinking about the workings of urban space in the Middle East