This presentation explores a captivating corruption case during the Late Ottoman Empire. Agob Boyacıyan, a prominent merchant of Armenian origin in Istanbul, forged an illicit collaboration with Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Minister of Postal Service and Telegraph. Boyacıyan was entrusted with the critical task of supplying material to the ministry and entered into a contractual agreement with it. Though Boyacıyan promised the delivery of goods amounting to a substantial two million Ottoman Lira, he and the pasha absconded with the funds, leaving the state bereft of essential supplies. What ensued was not a case of embezzlement but a web of deceit that implicated high-ranking officials during a period when state elites attempted to modernize bureaucratic affairs and fight against corruption and bribery. Initially shrouded in secrecy, Mehmed Ali Pasha attempted to conceal the malfeasance. As the gravity of the corruption became apparent, however, the scandal burst into the public sphere, casting a shadow on the government’s reputation. This scandal resulted in months-long tensions between different levels of state institutions and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry as the chamber vouched for Boyacıyan, who had served as a manager in this organization for years. Despite efforts to rectify the situation, state authorities proved inept in retrieving the misappropriated funds. This presentation analyzes this corruption case concerning the broader implications for the empire’s path toward modernization and the challenges faced in overcoming deep-rooted practices that hindered reforms. This scandal serves as a poignant illustration of the limitations inherent in the modernization reforms in the closing decades of the empire. Although political elites endeavored to propel their empire into a modernized state, instances of corruption such as this one underscored the persistence of old power structures and the systemic challenges within Ottoman state modernization. Based on official government documents, ministry archives, and contemporary newspaper articles and in dialogue with studies on the transformation of the Ottoman state by scholars, such as Carter Vaughn Findley and Kemal Karpat, this presentation identifies unique aspects of the collusion between Boyacıyan and Mehmed Ali Pasha and offers insights into corruption dynamics in the context of broader social and political transformation.

Tax farming has proven an attractive subject for historians of the early modern Ottoman economy. Through its diligent recordkeeping, the empire supplies modern scholars with vast amounts of hard economic data, but the question of how to interpret this data is much more vexed. Ottoman tax farming is usually understood as a competitive system in which entrepreneurial tax farmers bid against one another to raise the lease price (iltizam) that they contracted to pay to the state treasury in return for the right to administer a particular tax farm (mukata‘a). According to the standard model, this lease price would reflect the economic profitability of the associated tax farm, as well as the state’s willingness (or non-willingness) to risk assigning it to more daring entrepreneurs. Yet this standard model errs insofar as it considers only two actors: the tax farmer and the state, the latter imagined in the abstract. Missing are the individual bureaucrats, powerbrokers, and policymakers whose behind-the-scenes influence was a key factor in the awarding of tax farming contracts. Ottoman tax farmers did not negotiate with an abstract state, but with individuals, often self-interested, who at times used their positions of authority to demand kickbacks from tax farmers as a condition of their assignment. Instead of bidding to raise the lease price, these tax farmers could use bribery (often couched in the form of “presents” and “fees”) to prevail over their competitors in backroom deals. Provincial governors, who themselves were often required to pay enormous sums to purchase their offices, could also use their military authority to extort wealth from the tax farmers operating in their regions of jurisdiction. The present study uses seventeenth-century archival sources to reconstruct these shadowy financial exchanges, arguing that the institutional practice and political culture of tax farming cannot be understood without further investigation of the mechanisms through which tax farmers won their contracts and the conditions under which they worked.

The Ethics of Giving in Ottoman Society This paper examines the ethics of “giving,” i.e. philanthropy, charity, and public works among the ruling elite and the wealthy, from the inception of the Ottoman State to the formation of its classical institions in the sixteenth century. Ottoman society was particularly noted for its extensive undertaking of public works including but not limited to mosques, medreses, caravansarais, Sufi lodges, hospitals, libraries, public kitchens, orphanages, fountains, bridges, water canals, and roads. Current scholarly output on “giving” have so far focused on the economic, social, and legal aspects of the waqf institution while emphasizing personal “piety” as the foundation creating public value. Piety was certainly an important element of the creation of public value in Ottoman society. However, this work argues that there was a culturally embedded, strong ethical imperative for “giving”in Ottoman society. One of the most extensively written learned traditions in Ottoman society was ethics. This tradition of ethical learning was not exclusively Islamic and pietistic, as presumed, but also secular and humanistic. Books on ethics were compiled as performative texts to be read aloud in gatherings and had a significantly higher rate of circulation than any other branch of learning. These ethical works commonly glorified virtues related to “giving” which undergirded the creation of public works. The works of such authoritative figures as Eşrefoğlu Rumi, Aşık Paşa, Yazıcıoğlu, Amasi, and Kınalızade helped create a very dominant ethical discourse on righetous government and society. Most of this ethical literature were composed by famed Sufis whose teachings were already effective among large constituencies. This popular literature on ethics established a moral regime by which members of society were evaluated and judged, especially the members of the ruling elite. So, members of the dynastic family, statesmen, and any well-to-do member of the society were expected to comply with the ethical standards that stipulated to generate public value. That’s how individuals acquired nobility in Ottoman society. This moral regime stipulated that wealth and power are commendable and legitimate as long as they are used to generate public value.

Central to nearly every story about piracy lays an intrinsic tension – between pirates and their ancient enemy, the sovereign. Western political theory has traditionally defined both piracy and sovereignty as legal and political concepts that were constituted through distinction and definition2. But what if that was not always the case? Using indigenous accounts of piracy and stories of men at sea in the Arab Gulf region, this paper calls into question the figuring of the pirate as the anti-sovereign, showcasing how their actions at sea constituted an indigenous form of competing sovereignty that unsettled the fixed concept of Westphalian sovereignty the British Empire sought to achieve in the wake of its domination. It seeks to pull apart the exercise of sovereign power by unmooring it from the state, focusing instead on how Gulf pirates were rational actors who underwent self-organization by forming political agreements, through indigenous protection systems, as a form of resistance to Westphalian sovereignty and the sanctity of property within colonized spaces. Such a perspective helps center the experiences of Indigenous people, rather than the modern nation-state, in relation to the concept of political community, the “people”, and by reshaping meanings of Gulf Indigenous self-determination once it is uncoupled from the Westphalian notion of ‘sovereignty’ and territoriality’.

This paper aims to uncover the early efforts of Abdulhamid to determine his method of rule. It also sheds light on a rather obscure character in Ottoman history: Grand Vizier Tunuslu Hayreddin. Hayreddin was brought to Istanbul as a Circassian slave around 1839. His master sent him as a gift to the ruler of Tunisia shortly thereafter. Hayreddin excelled in the Tunisian army and was later sent to Paris. In 1867 he published a book called The Surest Path, which was translated into several languages. In his book, Hayreddin defines how a wise ruler should delegate authority to competent ministers. After returning to Tunis, Hayreddin was able to obtain a position akin to Prime Minister. However, internal and external forces cooperated to oust this reformist leader in 1877. In August 1878, Sultan Abdulhamid invited Hayreddin to Istanbul. Only three months after his arrival he was appointed as the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. He was the only Grand Vizier who could not speak Turkish fluently. In this paper the archival material pertaining to the correspondence between the Sultan and the Grand Vizier will be examined. It is amazing to discover the discussions about power distribution in these documents. Hayreddin repeatedly puts forth a blueprint for reform and tried to convince Abdulhamid that the ruler always had veto rights. Although the Grand Vizier was forced to resign in 1879, their meetings continued until Hayreddin’s death in 1890. This paper illuminates how upward mobility and meritocracy continued to exist in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. A Circassian slave who rose to prominence in Tunisia was able to get the top position in the system. The young sultan took the courageous step of appointing an Arab speaker as the Grand Vizier. Hayreddin forced the Sultan to reform the Ottoman Empire and distribute powers to the bureaucracy. Although Abdulhamid chose to retain his authority it is clear that this experience was critical in the development of the young Sultan.