Through a combination of textual analysis of leadership statements and interviews with young cadres of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, this paper traces the movement’s evolving understanding of its political and Islamic mission in the year since its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, gained control of Egyptian government. I analyze the vision of the Islamist project that emerges from young MB division leaders’ discourse and the Morsy government’s statements on the state’s role in defending and promoting Islam – whether through legislative ‘red lines’ defending sharia-based social and legal norms, ‘Islamizing’ state institutions, or promoting an Islamist economic policy – and the role they see for traditional movement da’wa and political activism compared with that for state and judicial authorities in realizing the Islamic polity. I also consider what vision of an Islamic polity emerges from new training programs the MB have developed for members involved in political work. I ask whether the demands of electoral competition have pushed the MB/FJP to emphasize a more conservative religious line in their training (in response to Salafi success), or to focus on populist politics and the mechanics of winning elections. Finally, I consider how the movement’s self-image of being the premier Islamist organization in Egypt is changing as it focuses on the challenges of governance and increasingly cedes the initiative for Islamic policies to other Islamist parties and an independent al-Azhar, and ask what may happen to the movement’s identity as it increasingly emphasizes electoral majorities rather than religious leadership as the basis of its Islamist mandate.

This paper compares religious pluralism, secularism and state policy in Turkey and Greece. Both are officially secular states but they each favor and support a particular religion in their territory: In the Greek case, Orthodoxy is constitutionally recognized as the “prevalent religion”. The Orthodox Church of Greece gained its special status in 1833 when it became autocephalous; and to this day it enjoys privileged treatment and support from the Greek state. In the Turkish case, the state exercises considerable control over religious practice through the Directorate of Religious Affairs which services and supports Sunni Islam. Founded in 1924 after the abolition of the caliphate the Directorate has witnessed an exponential growth in the last decades and is currently one of the largest public. The ways that the Turkish and Greek states nurtured and supported their respective official religions show significant differences. The first part of the paper will compare the ways in which these ostensibly secular states provide de jure and de facto support to Sunni Islam and Orthodoxy. In this regard, particular attention will be paid to the underlying interlinkages with the project of building a cohesive and distinct national identity, both in its “harder”/political and “softer”/cultural versions. The second part of the paper will focus on the relatively closed character of these religious markets and the issue of minorities. While both Turkey and Greece have religious minorities, their status and plight varies significantly. Specifically, one can distinguish between “historic religions” (such as Islam, Roman Catholicism and Judaism in Greece and Orthodoxy, Judaism in Turkey) and “new comers” (such as Protestantism and Jehovah’s Witnesses). While the former are recognized but controlled and insulated by the state, the latter are perceived as being threatening “intruders” and face both official and de facto harassment.