The article aims to critically analyze the South-South cooperation for the reconstruction of Syria. To do so, it focuses on the case study of Brazil and its national aid agency operations during the period of 2016 and 2018. The article is based on field research conducted in Damascus and Aleppo and interviews with government agents in Brazil and Syria . Since political dynamics prevent the participation of traditional donors from the Global North in the reconstruction process of Syria, the analysis of alternative actors are particularly relevant. In this sense, cooperation with countries of the Global South promotes reflections on two parallel points: whether there are different cooperation mechanisms coming from these peripheral countries and if the overall structural repercussions of such programs can also be classified as distinct. The relationship of Brasilia and the Middle East has historically been long, with a significant flow of Syrians and Lebanese migrating to South America since the 19th century. Presently, eight million descendants of Syrian Lebanese migrants, who are widely dispersed throughout the country and represent one of the most politically and economically successful ethnic groups or immigrant communities. In the diplomatic sphere, Brazil has established a bold diplomatic record of linking anti-racist and anti-colonial activism with expressions of solidarity with the Middle East, specifically in 1970s debates on Zionism, and in the United Nations World Conference against Racism in 2001. Brazilian diplomats have mediated East Timor peace diplomacy, achieving success in negotiations with the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia. And Brazilian peacemaker Sérgio Vieira de Mello died at the helm of the UN Humanitarian Mission in Iraq. Specifically to the Syrian crisis, the Brazilian government has always described it has an internal issue, emphasizing that international interventions could be perceived as violations of the principles of self-governance. The narrative of absolute respect for Syrian sovereignty meant that the Brazilian Embassy remained open throughout the conflict, including recurring visits from high political figures such as former presidents. The Brazilian case raises relevant discussions on South-South cooperation for the reconstruction of Syria. There are still few exhaustive studies on the consequences of apolitical aid narratives, reinforced by Brazil and BRICS in general. It is also important to reinforce the need for countries that present their aid in technical terms to be aware that their efforts can be reallocated to reconfigure the urban landscape and power dynamics.

Elections in post-2003 Iraq are typical cases of “a snapshot census on ethnicity,” as K. Samuels (2009:184) describes, if we include sectarian factors in ethnicity. Most of the analysis on post-2003 elections in Iraq underline the role of sect-based identity politics, though recent arguments point out the shift from sectarian mobilization to an issue-based electoral strategy (Mansour 2018) or to policies based on generation (Patel 2018). Scholars who emphasize sectarian factors mostly ascribe the difference in mobilization pattern of the major electoral blocs to sectarian differences, focusing on the persistence of sect-based mobilization among “Shi’ites” while tribal mobilization is more effective in “Sunni” regions. This presentation, however, casts doubt on the coincidence between territoriality and co-sectarian solidarity in electoral politics and places more importance on local interests based on the former rather than the latter as a driver in the elections in post-2003 Iraq. My question here is how the major electoral political blocs, most of which are led by former expatriates from Iran, Syria and the UK, deal with the local political figures and parties, while pursuing their political goals at the national level. For that purpose, I analyze how the major electoral political blocs have formed alliances with medium- and small-sized political parties and prepared the lists of the candidates for the elections, both national and governorate, since 2005. In order to analyze which type of candidates the political parties or blocs understand are able to obtain more votes from the voters, I introduce the notion of “source of the fame,” that is, candidates’ social and political affiliations and backgrounds which could be the points aiding voters to judge when choosing electoral blocs or candidates. Analysis shows three patterns of nomination of the candidates that reflect the views of the current political powers on the possible preference of the voters. They are (1) established elites both from higher posts in the government or parliament, (2) local leaders who have contributed the local communities, and (3) traditional social elites who rely on their sub-state social identity (religious, sectarian and tribal identity) for their social influence. Pattern (3) was only dominant in 2005 and shifted to pattern (2) afterward in both “Shi’ite” and “Sunni” regions.

Formed in Tehran in 1982 at the behest of Iran’s clerical elite, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was conceived to provide a bureaucratic framework for the unification of the various Iraqi Shi‘i organizations exiled in Iran. Due to the circumstances surrounding the Council’s formation scholars have fixated exclusively on SCIRI’s relationship with Iran, a focus that has yielded characterizations of the Council as an Iranian sycophant. Yet during the United States’ pre-war planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, SCIRI secured privileges and political concessions that were disproportionate to those received by other Iraqi opposition groups. Not only was SCIRI able to obtain the lion’s share of political representation during the U.S.-sponsored London opposition conference held in December 2002 but, come May 2003, the Council secured a position of leadership in the Iraqi Interim Authority. Given SCIRI’s designation as an Iranian proxy, these realities are quite striking as they ostensibly challenge claims that officials in Washington were determined to curtail Iranian influence in post-war Iraq. Consequently, understanding how the Supreme Council obtained these prerogatives within the Bush administration’s initial vision for a post-Saddam Iraq is the central aim of this paper. Beyond adding several layers of complexity to a historiography that has focused primarily on SCIRI’s relationship with Iran, this paper will also further scholars’ understanding of the new political contexts that members of the Iraqi opposition movement were forced to navigate throughout the 1990s. By utilizing memoirs from SCIRI officials and U.S. diplomats tasked with coordinating the pre-war planning phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom this study will show that, whereas SCIRI’s hopes of installing an Islamic government in Iraq had initially relied solely upon an Iranian military over Saddam, the shifting priorities and commitments of its host-state in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War prompted the Supreme Council to seek new allies within the Iraqi opposition movement and the United States. It will then demonstrate how these relationships enabled SCIRI to emerge from the 1990s as the United States’ preferred partner within the Shi‘i bloc of the Iraqi opposition movement, and show that officials within the Bush administration displayed a predilection towards empowering familiar elements within the Iraqi opposition when forging their initial plans for post-war Iraq. When considered collectively, these findings suggest that SCIRI’s exploits between 2002 and May 2003 can be attributed to the new partnerships the Supreme Council acquired during the 1990s.

To what extent Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites in Iraq discriminate against each other? Does the sectarian narrative impact on people’s discriminatory attitudes? What is the role of religiosity, living in segregated cities, and in cities with higher levels of violence in determining discrimination between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites? For over a century Iraq has been caught up in interlocking pattern of ethno-sectarian conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism. Between 2006 and 2007, the Sunni-Shiite civil war caused approximately twenty three thousand deaths and internally displaced over three million people (Dawisha, 2009; Kirmanc, 2013). A UN report released in 2016 stated that between January 2014 and October 2015 more than eighteen thousand civilians were killed and another three million people were displaced in the war against the Sunni terrorist group ISIS. These conflicts and the institutionalization of ethno-sectarian differences in Iraq post-2003 aggravated relations among various ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups, especially between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites. This study uses Arab Barometer, Wave II collected in 2011 to investigate the variance in Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites discriminatory attitudes. The existing literature theorizes that sectarianism is institutionally generated. It narrowly focuses on political actors and their exclusive role in shaping and manipulating identities. The problem with this macro analysis is that it ignores the attitudinal dimension of sectarianism and it vaguely investigates people’s beliefs and attitudes. This study fills this gap and it offers a micro level analysis of sectarian discrimination practiced through everyday social interaction. Further, the two binary approaches to the study of sectarianism-primordialism and constructivism-ignore the more subtle forms of ethno-sectarian discrimination and prejudice (Haddad, 2014). This study fills this gap and it argues that the complexity of ethno-sectarian dynamics cannot be restricted to just violence or active hatred. For example sectarian discrimination can be manifested in subtle, unintentional, and even in unconscious ways (Davis, 2010; Haddad, 2014). Another important contribution of this study is that it pushes theories of sectarianism beyond primordialism and constructivism by offering a social psychological perspective to this issue. This study explores how in-group identity-religious and sectarian-, as well as contact help to explain variation in sectarian discrimination. Finally, this study will illuminate patterns of variations across different Iraqi cities. This will help policy makers, local government, and post-conflict policy interventionists identify better the factors that constrain the process of peaceful building and peace coexistence in Iraq.