Iran's democratic demands over the past century have proceeded in three major waves. Iran's first wave (1820s-1911), the second wave (1950-1953) and the third wave (1977-present). The third wave began with the Revolution (1977-1979), was interrupted by the post-revolutionary politics, was revived in the 1997 Movement (Khatami's government), was reversed in 2005 (Iran's neo-conservatives power, Ahmadinejad), and again was revived in the current Green Democratic Movement (since June 2009 election). This paper examines whether the current Green Democratic Movement is capable of materializing Iran's a century-old quest for democracy What structural and agential factors contribute to the success and/or failure of Iran's Green Movemente A major controversy in democratization literature revolves around the issue of agency and structure. This paper keeps an equal distance from vulgar voluntarism and structural determinism to examine the dialectal interactions between structural and agential factors and their ability to help or hinder democratization in Iran's Green Movement. The paper provides an operational definition of structure and agency by subdividing each into three levels of analysis. The structural factors are measured by reviewing the institutional structure of the Iranian state (political level), Iran's uneven development (socio-economic level), and the global structure of power (international level). The agential factors, both in terms of reform and the counter-reform, are examined in terms of the leadership capability (individual level), the organizational arrangements (institutional level), and the intellectual discourse (cultural-ideological level). The findings (fieldwork and context analysis) suggest that Iran's democratization is surrounded by a number of domestic and international obstacles: Iran's oil-centered rentier state, the populist discourses employed by Iran's neo-conservatives who are blessed by powerful institutions and favorable structural conditions (social injustice), the realpolitik of the international politics (puts democracy next to the security concerns by focusing on Iran's nuclear issue not democracy), and the weakness of the leadership, well-organized civil society institutions, and inclusive and engaging political discourse on the part of the reformists. However, Iran's future prospect is optimistic due to the following elements: a radial epistemic shift in Iran's political culture (non-violence, the slogan of "where is my vote" not "where is my gun", celebrating pluralism, co-existence of religious and secular agents), a serious factional politics at the top of the political establishment, and a vibrant civil society due to the radial demographic/structural change. For all these reasons the Green Movement will most likely succeed to bring in a "democracy from within" in the mid-term.

Green wave's protests are often among the first ten headlines of international newspapers, yet they are superficially described or not contextualized in the longer history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The recent protests (Ashura and 22 bahman's celebrations) and President Ahmadinejad's declarations on nuclear enrichment have shown that the situation is complex and hardly conceivable as the last chapter of a historical struggle of a "homogeneous Iranian people" against a "homogeneous government" for freedom and democracy. This paper aims at investigating 3 aspects of the present situation to point out some elements which may be useful to make sense of the direction Iran has taken (or is taking). International politics, ideological orientation, domestic conflicts and a critical perspective may tell us something more about the protests than the definition of current events as an overall fight for freedom. The first dimension is the "ideological" one. It seeks at considering the relation between the green movement and the reform movement - and the whole revolutionary ideology, paying attention to their inner heterogeneity, ambiguity and re-interpretation of the revolutionary legacy. The strength of the boundaries between these two political experiences are evident: the leaders and many of the key words mobilizing people to protest are highly similar, or even the same. This investigation is important as we may individuate some directions of the protests. Second, we address our attention to the social and political composition of the green movement. Indeed it has changed since last June: hows Why Through which kind of means has the government succeed in reducing/managing the participation to demonstrations. The third trajectory to be followed is linked to international politics. Recent changes in American as well as European attitude toward Iran must be taken into consideration to deliver a more precise analysis of the Iranian situation. The nuclear talks, in particular, are of great importance to understand both Iranian reactions to domestic dissent and the strives dividing the different souls of the "hard-line conservative" government. The sources are collected from speeches, Iranian/international newspapers, and from the account of direct witnesses.

One age group that perhaps has been affected considerably by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its laws is the youth, especially those between the ages of twenty and thirty years old. This population has grown up under the Islamic Republic of Iran and has grappled with issues of forced religiosity within a society of many social and political restrictions. Within at least some of the twenty- to thirty-year old demographic group, despite the official religious state and its prescriptions, there appears to be a trend in shifting religious attitudes and behaviors away from Islamic ideology, which is consistent with prevailing research conducted by Moaddel, Norris and Inglehart. By utilizing in-depth interviews of young, urban, middle- and upper-middle class Iranian adults from Tehran and Mashhad, their reasons for abandoning Islam fall within five categories: 1) unanswered questions about the Islamic religion; 2) friends and family verbalizing their personal issues with Islamic ideology; 3) perceived hypocrisy within Iranian society and among Islamic authority figures; 4) perceived political suppression and the use of religion by the polity to instill fear; and, 5) awareness of the existence of other belief systems. Additionally, the participants identified with these philosophies/religious ideologies: 1) Buddhism; 2) atheism; 3) New Age spirituality/the self-help movement; and, 4) a combination of these mentioned.

Political opportunity concepts or perspectives seek to explain the emergence trajectory and outcomes of a movement by examining its political milieu. Therefore, analyses using this concept are working on this premise that "exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement's prospects for (a) mobilizing, (b) advancing particular claims rather than others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather than others, (d) employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and (e) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy." It is now also widely accepted in the literature that political opportunities and threats are perceptions that protestors attribute to their political. However, while the subjective aspect of opportunities and threats is recognized in the literature, the issue of disagreement over opportunities and threats is downplayed in the literature. In fact, it is possible that different actors within the field of a social movement disagree over opportunities and threats for movement. I shall also argue that movement actor's assessments of opportunity and threat involve their theories of history and socio-political change, in that actors analyze their political context through these theories. Besides, agreement is disagreement over these perceptions is important in the coalitional dynamics of the movement. Diverging and converging perceptions of opportunity and threat matter for the disintegration and formation of coalitions within movements. The Iranian Reform Movement (1997-2005) might be an interesting case in which to study disagreement over political opportunities and threats. The Iranian reform won the presidential elections in 1997 and 2005, won the municipalities in 1998 and legislature in 2000 and lost them in turn in 2005, 2002, and 2004. In all these eight years there were different debates within the movements about threats and opportunities for movement. While one side including president Khatami and his allies considered radicalism and mass mobilization as threats for the movement, there were other important individuals and political groups within the movement criticizing the former for missing opportunities for more radical break and more aggressive strategies for proceeding reforms. My data consist of three main parts. The first part includes interviews and articles from different active members of the reform movement between 1997 and 2005. The second part of data is interviews that I conducted with five prominent members of the reform movement during the summer of 2007. The third part of data is made up of interviews and articles of the movement members after 2005.

Understanding the recent rapprochement between Iran and America deserves due attention in the current conjuncture of international relations. Although geographically distant and culturally different, Latin Americans and Iranians have sought measures to harmonize diplomatic and commercial never before seen so far, especially in the last two decades, where both sides suffered several political and economic changes. The search for understanding of these relationships - within the scopes: nuclear, economic relationship, diplomatic / military cooperation - is essential in order to clarify the strategies behind them. According to FONSECA, Brian (2008), FARAH, Douglas (2009), CARO, Isaac; RODR?GUEZ, Isabel (2009), both sides have their own ambitions: Iran seeks a way out of the consequences of its isolation suffered since the Islamic Revolution, trying to diversify its imports and making new political allies who can bail them out within multilateral moves that could affect the Persian nation; on the other hand, Latin America, with Brazil and Venezuela at the head of this relationship, try to expand their exports and strengthen the flow of petrodollars. Both countries also seek, within its foreign policies, a strong regional player that can back each other decisions in international arena. Within the past 20 years, yet, this work also explains nuclear negotiations and strategic military cooperation that bind the two parts; being these issues usually restless among international diplomatic circles. Especially now, where the Persian nation is under the government of Mahmood Ahmadinejad and leftist governments become stronger in Latin America, this ratio reaches a level well advanced. Foreign policy advisors of Ahmadinejad are openly counting on Iran's new relations with Latin America as one of the net gains of his presidency. In fact, the new level of cooperation between Iran other Latin American countries is a timely, further confirmation of the strategic vision and outlook that they have brought to the government, compared with the Khatami's government that pushed the arch of detente with the West almost to the exclusion of all else. Therefore, new paradigms are imposed by Tehran and Latin Americans, making of South-South cooperation worth, starting relations so far unprecedented and may change the international scenario in a medium to long term, which may affect hemispheric powers and threat their international interests. Keywords: Iran, Latin America, Diplomacy, Relations, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Strategy, Geopolitics.