ABSTRACT: Mulla Sadra’s (c 1571-1640) commentary on Usul al-Kafi is one of the more famous commentaries on this significant Shi‘i hadith collection. For his philosophical and Sufi background, Sadra’s approach to the hadith is slightly different and in some ways contrary to the earlier commentators such as Allama Majlisi in Shi‘a and Ibn Taymiyya in Sunni Islam regarding the nature of Intellect. This paper aims to shed light on the way Sadra interprets al-Kafi and particularly to determine his understanding of the Aql (intellect) at the cosmic (as first created-being) and human levels as presented in the Kit?b al-Aql wa al-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance). Sadra, already well-versed in the philosophical discourses on ontology and cosmology, finds al-KAFI as a fertile ground to develop and extend his vision of cosmos and existence. This paper, furthermore, investigates and reviews some later and contemporary scholars’ critiques of Sadra’s view on hadith and intellect.

The primary Shia hadith book, Usul al-Kaafi, contains many detailed philosophical speculations. In particular, it contains detailed philosophical elaborations on the nature of God. As a hadith book, that is to say, a collection of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and his twelve successors are rich in detailed philosophical postulations. Many of these hadiths specifically challenge and dispute Sunni theology. The religion of Shia Islam was born out of and shaped by a theological war with Sunni Islam. One can deduce this from the hadiths which are specifically directed as philosophical polemics against the followers of Sunni schools of theology. In particular, one of the most profound differences between Sunni and Shia theology is in regards to the conception of God. Sunni hadith books portray God as occupying a place and being subjected by time. However, Shia hadiths specifically set God outside of place and outside of time and elaborates on the nature of Monotheism. The importance of the theological arguments of Usul al Kafi demonstrate that Sunni and Shia Islam, in early Islamic history, crystalized into two distinct theological traditions. This demonstrates not only a difference between Sunni and Shia Islam in early Islamic history. It also reveals the shortsightedness of the views in western scholarship which tend to focus attention onto the legal and political aspects of Islamic history. The difference between Sunni and Shia Islam transcends a mere political dispute, and goes well beyond the bounds of differences in jurisprudence.

This paper focuses on the modern Arab reception of the medieval intellectual dialogue between al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Averroes (d. 1198). While al-Ghazali is believed by many to be the Muslim medieval scholar who defended Islam against Greek philosophy and certain medieval Muslim philosophers who attempted to reconcile between Islam and Greek philosophy, Averroes is believed by many to be refuting al-Ghazali and defending Greek philosophy and Muslim philosophers. There are two main intellectual groups in the Arab-Islamic world concerning this dialogue. One of the groups insists that Arab intellectuals should abide by the teachings of al-Ghazali if they need to protect Islamic religion and theological beliefs from what is considered by them to be foreign thought whether it be Greek or European. This group can be characterized by taking al-Ghazali for granted. The majority of them are not well trained in Islamic philosophy, but they are well educated in other fields of Islamic thought such as theology and jurisprudence. In contrast, the scholars of the other group defend the idea that Averroes’s philosophy is the lifeline for Arab intellectuals if they dream of being in line with the western civilization. The scholars of this group accuse al-Ghazali of being responsible for the intellectual decadence of Muslims. While al-Ghazali is Hujjat al-Islam (the proof of Islam) for the first group, he is Nakbat al-Islam (the catastrophe of Islam) for the second group. This paper involves a careful reading for the works of al-Ghazali and Averroes. This will help me to investigate their reception in the modern Arab-Islamic world by scholars such as Sulaiman Dunya who edited three of al-Ghazali’s main works and wrote in defense of al-Ghazali; Mohammed Abed al-Jabri whose philosophical project is based on reviving Averroes’s philosophy in the Arab-Islamic world; Abu Yarub al-Marzuqi who introduced a new reading for the dialogue between al-Ghazali and Averroes. Why did modern Arab-Islamic thought receive al-Ghazali’s thought warmly? Why was the reception of Averroes in modern Arab-Islamic thought almost nonexistent in comparison with the reception of his thought in Europe? Was al-Ghazali and Averroes’s dialogue understood correctly by Arab-Muslim intellectuals?

Alfarabi in many occasions introduces religion as an imitation (????????) of philosophy. This claim, despite its novelty and boldness for his time, strikes the reader as odd. What does it mean for a religion to be an imitation of philosophy? Alfarabi’s attempts to explain what he means by the claim, in fact, causes more puzzlement rather than clarification. In Tahsil, for instance, he states that both religion and philosophy “comprise the same subjects, and both give an account of the ultimate principles of being. For both supply knowledge about the first principle and cause of beings, and both give an account of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made—that is, supreme happiness—and the ultimate end of every one of the other beings” (90:15-21). This attempt for clarification is puzzling for it claims that both religion and philosophy “comprise the same subjects” while he leaves open the possibility that each one might give different and even contradictory accounts of the same subjects. The same can be said about the other alleged similarities that he draws between religion and philosophy, such as their respective accounts about the first principle, the ultimate principle, and human happiness. Beside the similarities that Alfarabi attributes the two, he mentions about a difference between religion and philosophy is the approach that each one takes. Alfarabi explains, “In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account bases on imagination. In everything demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion” (40:13-19). The difference between a rational account based on demonstration and an account based on imitation by using persuasive approaches is massive, and it has serious implications for Alfarabi’s initial contention that religion is an imitation of philosophy. Furthermore, the difference between demonstration and persuasion creates another rift between philosophy and religion. It is the difference between Aristotle’s discussion in his Organon and Metaphysics on the one hand and the metaphorical language and storytelling of the Bible. This vagueness in Alfarabi’s claim about religion while hi attempts for clarification causes more ambiguity deserves a scholarly investigation. In my paper, I shall argue that Alfarabi’s contention, religion as an imitation of philosophy, is an introduction to his method of writing which is philosophical representation or reformulation of religious beliefs. I shall also explain reasons for why, I think, he tries to represent religious beliefs philosophically.